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"A society that surrenders to others the means to depict itself would
soon be an enslaved society. "
-Francois Mitterand, President of France
"You make wonderful cheeses. Keep it up and let us, alone, make
films. "
-Jack Valenti, President, Motion Picture Association of America
Evil empire invades distant land, crushes resistance with superior
technology, and enslaves inhabitants through insidious mind-control.
The preceding sentence may resemble the plot of a Hollywood movie;
yet, to some, it serves as an allegory for the real-life battle over cultural
diversity with Hollywood itself cast in the role of evil empire. The struggle
to secure the planet from U.S. cultural imperialism has run headlong into
conflict with world trade law.' For the past three decades, culture defenders
and free traders have fought a pitched battle over global regulation of
audiovisual industries, a collision of seemingly incompatible worldviews
1 See C. Edwin Baker, An Economic Critique of Free Trade in Media Products, 78 N.C.
L. REv. 1357, 1366-77 (2000).
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whose destructive repercussions policy-makers and scholars have struggled
2to contain. The battle has played out at multiple levels of international
trade law, investment treaties, and UNESCO conventions. Now, the
culture-trade war threatens to engulf e-commerce.
Yet do culture and commerce really conflict? By assuming that trade
is incompatible with cultural diversity, European cultural protectionists
have fostered a defensive mindset that has proven self-defeating. Cultural
protection has failed in Europe with Hollywood emerging more dominant
than ever.
Fortunately, there is a better way. The extraordinary flowering of
Korean popular culture in recent decades-commonly known as the
"Korean Wave"-can be traced directly to a set of decentralized policies
enacted by South Korea's government in the 1990s. This Article argues
that cultural protection should be fundamentally reconceived based on
Korea's example. In place of the European "state patronage" model that
predominates today, the Article advocates an alternative approach that
embraces globalization and seeks to expand markets (rather than supplant
them) using decentralized, non-discriminatory tools. Adopting a "diversity
through trade" model would more effectively advance the goals of cultural
protection and avoid the need for further distortions of international trade
law and free speech.
This Article accepts that much of the world is committed to the project
of cultural protection. Concern over cultural diversity is unsurprising in a
2 For a sampling of recent commentary, see Mira Burri-Nenova, Trade and Culture in
International Law: Paths to (Re)conciliation, 44 J. WORLD TRADE 49 (2010); Christopher M.
Bruner, Culture, Sovereignty, and Hollywood: UNESCO and the Future of Trade in Cultural
Products, 40 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 351 (2008); Claire Wright, Reconciling Cultural
Diversity and Free Trade in the Digital Age: A Cultural Analysis of the International Trade
in Content Items, 41 AKRON L. REV. 399, 430-32 (2008); TANIA VooN, CULTURAL
PRODUCTS AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (2007); PATRICIA M. GOFF, LIMITs TO
LIBERALIZATION: LOCAL CULTURE IN A GLOBAL MARKETPLACE (2007); Chi Carmody,
Creating "Shelf Space": NAFTA's Experience with Cultural Protection and Its Relevance
for the WTO, 2 ASIAN J. WTO & INT'L HEALTH L. & POL'Y 287, 291-92 (2007); Christoph
Beat Graber, The New UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity: A Counterbalance to the
WTO?, 9 J. INT'L EcoN. L. 553 (2006); Michael Hahn, A Clash of Cultures? The UNESCO
Diversity Convention and International Trade Law, 9 J. INT'L EcON. L. 515, 523-24 (2006);
Stephen Azzi, Negotiating Cultural Space in the Global Economy: The United States,
UNESCO, and the Convention on Cultural Diversity, 60 INT'L J. 765, 773-83 (2005);
CULTURAL DIVERSITY AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: THE GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE OF THE AUDIO-VISUAL SECTOR (Paolo Guerrieri,et al. eds., 2005); CHRISTOPH
BEAT GRABER, MICHAEL GIRSBERGER & MIRA NENOVA, FREE TRADE VERSUS CULTURAL
DIVERSITY: WTO NEGOTIATIONS IN THE FIELD OF AUDIOVISUAL SERVICES (2004).
Peter Hettich, YouTube to be Regulated? The FCC Sits Tight, While European
Broadcast Regulators Make the Grab for the Internet, 82 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1447 (2008).
See infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
4 Of the World Trade Organization's 150 members, only the US, Albania, New Zealand
and Central African Republic have committed to fully liberalize audiovisual services, and
65
HeinOnline  -- 31 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 65 2011
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 31:63 (2011)
world where Hollywood movies account for more than 80% of global box
office sales, and American popular culture is pervasive.' Such global
dominance makes for one of the few bright spots in America's otherwise
dismal balance of trade and generates vital "soft power" that underpins U.S.
6hegemony. Yet, for countries on the receiving end, Hollywood's
dominance assumes a more sinister guise. Like the "conquistadors who
destroyed Inca and Aztec civilizations," American popular culture is said to
threaten a "mental colonization" that would enslave the rest of the world to
American thought and values.' The very underpinnings of the nation state
are imperiled.8
Such apocalyptic rhetoric bewilders Americans, who typically respond
by appealing to free market principles and consumer autonomy. The U.S.
argument essentially amounts to: "If your consumers don't like our movies
and TV shows, they don't have to watch them."9 Attempts by governments
to come between consumers and their living room screens are seen as
paternalistic, bordering on outright censorship. Americans also accuse
other countries of using cultural concerns as a smokescreen for economic
self-interest, casting the issue as one of free trade vs. protectionism. o
Cultural defenders retort that "culture is not a commodity." They
insist trade should yield, calling for a "cultural exception" to legitimize
trade discrimination in the name of cultural diversity.' Governments also
make ample use of existing loopholes and lacunae in world trade law to
protect domestic industries. As a result, audiovisual markets worldwide are
riven with tariffs, subsidies, quotas, and other barriers.12
the vast majority have made no commitments at all (reserving the right to engage in
unrestricted protection). Christoph Beat Graber, Audiovisual Media and the Law of the
WTO, in GRABER, GIRSBERGER & NENOVA, supra note 2, at 15, 23-24.
5 Wright, supra note 2, at 430-32.
6 See id Creative content industries rank second (behind aircraft manufacturing) as a
share of US total exports. Bruner, supra note 2, at 356 (describing audiovisual industries as
"the jewel in America's trade crown").
7 Simona Fuma Shapiro, The Culture Thief THE NEw RULES, Fall 2000, at 10.
8 See Victoria de Grazia, Mass Culture and Sovereignty: The American Challenge to
European Cinemas, 1920-1960, 61 J. MOD. HIST. 53, 53 (1989); see also Catherine
Lalumibre, The Battle of "Cultural Diversity", 38 LABEL FR. (2000), available at
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/article_imprim.php3?idarticle=7103 (equating cultural
identity with "entire reason for living").
9 Baker, supra note 1, at 1361. Such arguments ignore collective action problems and
externalities. Consumers may insufficiently value cultural diversity in making individual
purchasing decisions in the same way that commuters crowd freeways in their SUVs even
though they would prefer that society invest in environmentally friendly mass-transit
alternatives.
10 Id. Cf Shapiro, supra note 7, at 11 (quoting US trade official: "[w]hen we're talking
about cinema, I think it's largely a commercial issue and not a cultural issue").
" See VooN, supra note 2, at 63, 95.
12 See id. at 220.
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The fallout from this long-running battle has spread far beyond the
industries affected. Cultural concerns have repeatedly hindered wider
efforts to advance trade liberalizationl 3 and serve as a potent lightning rod
to mobilize globalization's opponents.14  Cultural protection has also
become a pretext for state censorship.' 5 As we stand on the cusp of a
digital convergence of technologies that is revolutionizing cultural
interchange, some foresee diversity concerns vanishing in a digital
cornucopia. However, in many ways, the advent of online content has
only sharpened protectionist instincts." To defuse such anxieties before
they do lasting damage, it is time to move beyond the sterile impasse of
"culture vs. trade." The real question is not whether to protect cultural
markets, but how. Korea's example points the way forward.
The argument that follows unfolds in four parts. Part I examines the
theoretical and legal underpinnings of cultural protectionism, explains its
focus on audiovisual media, and calls attention to the threat that European
protectionism poses to digital technologies and e-commerce. Part II
critiques the "state patronage" model of cultural protectionism widely
practiced in Europe and elsewhere. It catalogues the shortcomings of
patronage, namely that it: (1) overrides market feedback from audiences;
(2) neglects distribution, producing films that never get shown; (3) spawns
cumbersome bureaucracies; (4) caters to narrow, elitist tastes; and (5)
discourages exports. Part II concludes that European patronage has failed
due to fundamental defects in design.
Part III considers how cultural protection might be reinvented to avoid
such shortcomings. Part 111-A presents South Korea's "Korean Wave" as
an exemplar of cultural policy that, unlike state patronage, is: (1) market-
based; (2) distribution-focused; (3) decentralized; (4) non-discriminatory;
and (5) export-oriented. Part III-B demonstrates that South Korea's
approach has fostered higher quality, more diverse, and more authentic
domestic filmmaking, consistent with the goals of cultural protectionism.
Part III-C then examines case studies from film industries in India, Hong
Kong, and Nigeria that amplify and confirm the advantages of the Korean
model.
Lastly, Part IV distills some general lessons as to how cultural
protectionism can be reinvented in the decentralized, market-based image
exemplified by the Korean Wave. Part IV-A first addresses national policy,
describing the twin lodestars of the Korean model as: (1) keeping
filmmakers responsive to audiences and (2) developing export markets to
'3 See infra notes 26-27, 44-56 and accompanying text.
14 Joel Richard Paul, Cultural Resistance to Global Governance, 22 MICH J. INT'L L. 1, 6
(2000).
15 See infra notes 150-56 and accompanying text.
16 See infra note 360 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
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capture economies of scale. Unleashing the full potential for global markets
to foster cultural diversity, however, may require multilateral initiative. To
this end, Part IV-B proposes a novel "diversity quota" that would unleash a
global market for diverse filmmaking. By defining "diverse" solely by
reference to production budgets, the quota is designed to be consistent with
existing standards of world trade law.
I. THE BACKSTORY: STATE OF PLAY IN THE "TRADE &
CULTURE" DEBATE
A. Definitions & Rationales
The status of culture remains one of the major unresolved issues in
world trade law. 8 A basic precept of free trade holds that goods should
circulate in global markets without distinctions based on national origin.
By directly or indirectly favoring domestic products, cultural protection
runs counter to trade rules forbidding discrimination. 9 Hollywood loses
untold billions to such protection and naturally cries foul. 20
Defenders of cultural protection demur. They claim that cultural
goods embody externalities that market pricing fails to capture and that
therefore the norms of free trade should not apply. 2 ' To legitimize such
practices, cultural defenders have sought to enact a broadly-defined
"cultural exception" within world trade law.
1. Defining the Scope of Cultural Protection
Such efforts raise obvious definitional concerns. Culture is
22
notoriously hard to pin down as a concept.22 Critics of cultural protection
protest that anything can be deemed to have "cultural" value.23 Taken to an
18 Baker, supra note 1, at 1368.
19 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. III, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT] (requiring treatment of imports "no less favorable" than
that accorded to national products). Other standard weapons in the protectionist arsenal such
as quotas and subsidies run similarly afoul of GATT rules. See GATT, art. XI (forbidding
import quotas); Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, art. 5, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex lA, 1867
U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter Agreement on Subsidies] (restricting subsidies).
20 Bruner, supra note 2, at 355.
21 In general, homegrown culture is associated with positive externalities, see infra note
28, while imported content is seen as having negative effects. Cf Petra Cahill & Charlene
Gubash, Soap Opera Upends Traditional Arab Gender Roles, MSNBC WORLDBLOG (July
31, 2008, 12:48 PM), http://worldblog.msnbc.msn.com/archive/2008/07/31/1236952.aspx)
(describing disruptive effect of an imported television show).
22 In its broadest anthropological definition, culture embraces every aspect of human
society. Bruner, supra note 2 at 361-63.
23 Cf Tomer Broude, Taking "Trade and Culture" Seriously: Geographical Indications
and Cultural Protection in WTO Law, 26 U. PA. J. INT'L EcON. L. 623, 623 (2005) (quoting
claim that "[e]ach bottle of [imported] wine that lands in Europe is a bomb targeted at the
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extreme, a broadly defined cultural exception could potentially swallow the
rule of free trade.24  In practical terms, however, the audiovisual sector
represents the principal battlefield being contested.2 5 As far back as the
original 1947 GATT, trade negotiators insisted on a special rule enabling
"screen quotas" for domestic films-a cultural exception provision that
remains sui generis to this day.26 European demands to extend such quota
allowances to television almost torpedoed the launch of the World Trade
Organization (WTO).27 While that standoff was eventually finessed,
audiovisuals continue to command center stage in multilateral negotiations
and supply the principal target of cultural protectionism at the national
level. As a practical matter, this clear policy focus allows us to sidestep
definitional ambiguities. For present purposes, we will consider the domain
of cultural protectionism as limited to audiovisuals.
2. What Are We Protecting and Why?
This begs two questions: why culture, and why audiovisuals in
particular? These questions can be answered partly based on the underlying
economics of creative content production, which is subject both to
economies of scale and consumer preferences for home-grown content.
Particularly when it comes to full-length feature films, the high fixed costs
to produce original content compared to the marginal costs of exhibiting it
favors countries such as the U.S. whose producers can rely on a large,
wealthy domestic audience as their "home base." 2 8 Hollywood's resultant
scale economies support bigger budget productions that enjoy a competitive
29
advantage in global markets. Unsurprisingly, other countries regard the
heart of our rich European culture"); Paul, supra note 14, at 40-41 (observing that Japan
protects rice and certain liquors as "cultural").
24 Paul, supra note 14, at 34-35.
25 Broude, supra note 23, at 637 (describing extent to which "'culture' becomes
synonymous with the word 'audiovisual"' in the "trade and culture debate").
26 Article IV allows GATT signatories to impose "screen quotas" reserving cinema
exhibition time to domestic films. Article XX(f), allowing restrictions on export of"cultural
treasures" (i.e. antiquities), and Article XX(a), allowing exceptions based on public morals,
also enable forms of cultural protection. However, neither sanctions overt preference for
domestic industries in the way that Article IV does. See VOON, supra note 2, at 101-09.
27 The argument revolved around whether audiovisual broadcasts constituted goods vs.
services and whether they should be subject to a special exception. The impasse was
defused only by an eleventh hour "Agreement to Disagree" that left the issue essentially
unresolved. Id. at 25.
28 The comparative export advantage of big markets can be traced to a moderate cultural
discount effect, i.e., a preference by audiences for local content over foreign imports that acts
as a barrier but not an insuperable one. The higher budget productions supported by big
country markets allows them to export movies whose enhanced audience appeal overwhelms
the natural preferences of audiences in smaller market countries for films in their own
language or attuned to their domestic culture. See STEVEN S. WILDMAN & STEPHEN E.
SIWEK, INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN FILMS AND TELEVISION PROGRAMS 26-28, 33, 75 (1988).
29 Once the movie has been made, it does not cost much more to exhibit it to a broad
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playing field as stacked against them.
Yet such comparative advantages are normally taken as arguing in
favor of free trade, not an excuse to override the market. 30 Rather than
explaining the cultural exception, such competitive concerns therefore
merely underline the privileged status claimed for culture. Instead, a fuller
explanation lies in the intimate links between culture and national
sovereignty. Cultural imperialism touches an emotional nerve in a way that
other traded goods do not.
This "cultural sovereignty" perspective helps to explain the sometimes
apocalyptic rhetoric deployed by cultural protectionists." Such concerns
also explain the primacy of audiovisual industries in this debate.
Audiovisuals represent powerful mass media regarded as exerting lasting
influence on audiences.2 Governments instinctively seek to control such
natural instruments of power and resist foreign challenges to their
authority.33
Yet culture is not a zero-sum game. The free flow of ideas across
borders is normally regarded as a good thing that leaves everyone richer for
the exchange. Indeed, the "marketplace of ideas" is as much as a political
ideal as an economic one.34 Furthermore, there is no such thing as a "pure"
national culture to begin with. All cultures draw from a diverse blend of
traditions and influences. And culture is constantly evolving. To some
critics, the very idea of "protecting" a national culture is like trying to save
endangered butterfly by pinning them on the wall. Merely defining
"authentic" culture invites essentializing tendencies that can be seen as a
step toward authoritarian thought-control.35
audience as opposed to a narrow one. Costs to set up and maintain distribution networks are
subject to similar scale economies that give global players-namely the major Hollywood
studios-an advantage pushing their products. Hollywood also benefits from its
concentration of talent and equipment in a geographic cluster that allows cost-sharing and
other positive spillovers. Id. at 75.
30 Rather than condemning such comparative advantages as "unfair," we embrace them
as the basis for mutually profitable exchange. DAVID RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF
POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION 151-54 (R.M. Hartwell ed., Penguin Books 1971)
(1817).
31 See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
32 The Supreme Court of India has stated, "[F]ilm motivates thought and action and
assures a high degree of attention and retention as compared to the printed word. The
combination of act and speech, sight and sound in semi-darkness of the theatre with
elimination of all distracting ideas will have a strong impact on the minds of the
viewers.... [That] cannot be equated with other modes of communication." CENTRAL
BOARD OF FILM CERTIFICATION, Ministry Information & Broadcasting,
http://cbfcindia.gov.in/html/uniquepage.aspx?uniquepageid=6 (last visited Oct. 4, 2010).
3 MARTIN DALE, THE MOVIE GAME: THE FILM BUSINESS IN BRITAIN, EUROPE AND
AMERICA 116, 222 (1997).
34 See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 73 (1960) (arguing that truth can
be best tested through a competitive marketplace of ideas).
3 See Baker, supra note 1, at 1366-68 (critiquing "museum" view of culture).
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Advocates of cultural protection reject such accusations and the static
vision of culture that they presuppose. They justify their interventions by
defining culture as much in terms of process as outcome-a dynamic
conception of culture as an exercise in collective meaning-making by which
a community defines its cultural landscape through discursive practices. In
other words, "culture" is not a canonical set of traditions, but rather a
cluster of shared understandings reached through the production and
consumption of expressive works. This "dialogic" understanding of culture
does not privilege any particular heritage or tradition as authentic except to
the extent it continues to have salience within the relevant community.3
The rationale for cultural protection in turn derives from the value
placed on self-determination. While culture need not be hermetically sealed
from external influences, retaining a degree of autonomy allows each
country to define its own narrative. To participate in this semiurgical
process, members of the constituent citizenry need the ability to assign
shared meanings at least partly by reference to a body of cultural works that
they themselves have produced. Seeking a middle ground between cultural
autarchy and external domination, protectionists therefore seek to preserve a
space for each culture to evolve on its own terms rather than having the
process driven by cultural imports whose foreign content frames the
agenda."
Cultural defenders typically offer three specific rationales to justify
this value on autonomous cultural development: (1) national identity; (2)
democratic discourse; and (3) human heritage. The national identity
rationale highlights the role of culture as a force for social cohesion:
Cultural protection becomes an exercise in nation-building. The democratic
discourse rationale posits culture as a pre-political space for public
discourse that helps set agendas, clarify values, and highlight areas of
consensus or conflict. 39  Cultural protection focuses on securing "shelf
space" for a national conversation. Finally, the human heritage rationale
posits cultural diversity as a global public good. It analogizes cultural
diversity to biodiversity, with cultural protection akin to a nature preserve
that shelters fragile ecosystems from invasive alien influences.
Each of these rationales has been subject to an extensive critical
literature whose points and counterpoints will not be reproduced here.
3 Id. at 1370-71.
37 The idea is therefore not to give a monopoly to domestic works but merely to reserve
"shelf space" for them in a marketplace otherwise dominated by imports. See Azzi, supra
note 2, at 773-83.
3 See VoON, supra note 2, at 51-52.
39 Neil Weinstock Netanel, Asserting Copyright's Democratic Principles in the Global
Arena, 51 VAND. L. REV. 217, 273-75 (1998). Note this analysis applies to works of
entertainment, not just journalism. See id. at 275 (explaining that "attempts to present
information and opinion in a systematic 'objective' manner, distilled from entertainment
values, may simply lose the audience").
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Instead, we will take these rationales at face value in order to assess the
extent to which cultural protectionist policies have been successful in
achieving their own stated objectives. It is worth noting that at least two of
these rationales-national identity and democratic discourse-dovetail
nicely with cultural protectionism's emphasis on audiovisuals. To mold
identities and stimulate public discourse you need to reach a broad spectrum
of the populace; audiovisuals are a natural mass media. Furthermore, these
rationales suggest a focus on popular culture, as such works are likely to
have the greatest impact both in terms of audience size and resonance with
the prevailing zeitgeist.40 Cultural production narrowly targeted at elites is
unlikely to win hearts and minds on scale sufficient to achieve
protectionism's aims. 4' Therefore, in allocating shelf space for
homegrown audiovisuals, popular works deserve pride of place.42
B. Legal Impasse & Proposed Solutions
1. Legal Uncertainty & Impasse
Until now, the U.S. has been successful in fending off demands for a
broad cultural exception in the WTO, thereby denying cultural
protectionism formal sanction in world trade law.43 However, the U.S. has
hardly won the argument. The impasse continues to generate international
rancor that causes significant collateral damage.4 Meanwhile, the status
40 Oliver Goodenough, Defending the Imaginary to Death? Free Trade, National
Identity, and Canada's Cultural Preoccupation, 15 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 203, 210. To
the extent one considers diversity as defined by individual works, the "diversity as human
heritage" rationale might seem to point in a different direction: Avant-garde work pitched at
cultural elites might make a more lasting contribution to collective cultural achievement
bequeathed to humanity. Yet, to explain the preoccupation with audiovisual diversity, in
particular, we arguably need to shift our focus away from the diversity value of individual
works to emphasize instead the effect that audiovisuals have upon the broader cultural
landscape. In other words, the contribution that audiovisuals make to global diversity lies
less in the works themselves and instead inheres in their systemic effects in influencing
hearts and minds (i.e., at the "ecosystem" rather than "species" level). On this reading of the
diversity rationale, the motive forces at play differ little from the national identity and
democratic governance rationales, and a popular culture focus again becomes appropriate.
41 Similarly, "frivolous" works of entertainment may prove more effective than serious
discourse. Netanel, supra note 39, at 266.
42 As we will see, a key criticism of protection regimes based on state patronage is that
their bias toward elite works has been counterproductive. See infra notes 190-98 and
accompanying text.
43 Paul, supra note 14, at 33-35. The US has accepted cultural exceptions in
regional/bilateral trade agreements. See Hahn, supra note 2, at 523-24 (discussing
CUSFTA, NAFTA, and Australian-US FTA).
4 The collapse of the MAI Agreement on foreign investment may be directly traced to
unresolved demands for a "cultural exception" provision. VOON, supra note 2, at 31-32.
The result was the abandonment of years of negotiation over a complex international
instrument covering a wide range of investment activities largely unrelated to culture. Other
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quo satisfies no one. Hollywood continues to forfeit billions in lost sales to
protectionist barriers. Countries that want to protect their cultural industries
have ways to do so under existing trade law. Yet they must navigate a
crazy quilt of overlapping rules and exceptions whose contours remain
shrouded in uncertainty.45 Legal jeopardy looms against those who push
the boundaries too far or who fail to reserve their rights.46
Frustrated by the WTO stalemate, cultural protectionists have looked
elsewhere to advance their agenda.47 Cultural exception provisions
continue to be written into regional and bilateral trade agreements.48
Meanwhile, the 2005 UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity
represents a deliberate attempt to outflank trade law by developing binding
international norms in a more hospitable forum. 49  Potential conflicts
between the Convention and WTO law have only added to the legal
uncertainty surrounding regulation of cultural markets.o
free trade agreements continue to face similar resistance on cultural grounds. See id. at 32-
33; Won-Mog Choi, Screen Quota and Cultural Diversity: Debates in Korea-US FTA Talks
and the Convention on Cultural Diversity, 2 AsIAN J. WTO & INT'L HEALTH L. & POL'Y 267,
271 (2007).
45 The WTO has separate rules for goods and for services, each with their own exceptions
and limitations, although the boundary between the two regimes can be murky. See VooN,
supra note 2, at 119, 223. While states can define their commitments to liberalize services a
la carte on a sectoral and modal basis, doing so entails navigating an arcane system of
scheduled opt-ins and opt-outs that do not readily match emerging technologies and business
models. Id. at 109-17, 224.
46 GATS scheduling can become a game of "gotcha" with unanticipated consequences as
both New Zealand and South Korea found to their chagrin. See Jane Kelsey, How Trade
Trumps Culture, TowARD FREEDOM (July 25, 2005), available at http://www.
towardfreedom.com/globalism/514-how-trade-trumps-culture; Ivan Bernier, Developing
Countries and the Plan for an International Convention on Cultural Diversity 7 (Nov. 26,
2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.screenquota.com/v2/eng/board/
read.asp?board=engresearch&category-title&keyword=developing&page=1 &id=7065.
Likewise, the maximum level of subsidies permissible is a guessing game. States may
trigger countervailing duties whenever their subsidies adversely affect foreign competitors.
See Claire Wright, Hollywood's Disappearing Act: International Trade Remedies to Bring
Hollywood Home, 39 AKRON L. REv. 739, 744-45 (2006) (arguing Canadian film subsidies
would be actionable). Moreover, trade commitments are cumulative. Cultural exceptions in
one agreement may be trumped by commitments made under another as Canada unhappily
discovered. See Carmody, supra note 2, at 294-97. Fear of such unanticipated
consequences makes countries hesitate to liberalize even where doing so would seem
advantageous. VooN, supra note 2, at 226.
47 See, e.g., Azzi, supra note 2, at 773-83.
48 See Hahn, supra note 2, at 523-24.
49 Azzi, supra note 2, at 773-83. Cf Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs
Agreement and New Dynamics ofInternational Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J.
INT'L L. 1 (2004) (describing strategy of shifting forums to gain leverage in negotiations
over international intellectual property law).
5o The interaction between the Convention and WTO treaties has attracted considerable
commentary. The Convention itself does not purport to alter preexisting obligations, but as a
clear signal of the global value placed on cultural diversity, it is not without effect as soft
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Nor is the status quo sustainable. E-commerce and digital
communications have presented a host of unresolved issues in recent WTO
dispute resolution.5 1 As the U.S. pushes its trading partners to commit to
full digital liberalization, European resistance has been escalating. 52
Already, a spate of unilateral European interventions threatens to cripple the
promise of the digital economy. These conflicting courses make a
showdown over regulation of online culture all-but inevitable.
2. Bridging the Gap - A New Approach
A broad spectrum of proposals to resolve the impasse over the cultural
exception has been placed on the table. Most proposals focus on the legal
deadlock in the WTO while sidestepping the underlying ideological
dispute.54 Such proposals typically conceive of cultural protection as
practiced under the European model of state patronage. Rather than
questioning whether such an inwardly-focused approach makes sense, they
assume that cultural diversity is inherently at odds with trade and seek to
law. Graber, supra note 2, at 558-60.
s See Sacha Wunsch-Vincent, Trade Rules for the Digital Age, in GATS AND THE
REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN SERVICES 497, 498 (Marion Panizzon, Nicole Pohl
& Pierre Sauve, eds., 2008).
52 See Mira Burri-Nenova, Trade Versus Culture in the Digital Environment: An Old
Conflict in Need of a New Definition, 12 J. INT'L ECON. L. 17, 53 (2008) (describing
European paranoia about US trade agreements that grandfather cultural exceptions for "old
media" while leaving digital domains open to American colonization). Cultural
protectionists also fear the impending technological obsolescence of existing safeguards.
See infra notes 118-19 and accompanying text. As a result, Europe has increasingly dug in
its heels resisting GATS liberalization. Wunsch-Vincent, supra note 51, at 499. It has also
pressed the cause of cultural diversity in internet governance. Konstantinos Komaitis,
Aristotle, Europe and Internet Governance, 21 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL Bus. & DEv. L. J.
57, 61 -70 (2008).
s3 The EU Audiovisual Media Services Directive represents a first step toward regulating
diversity online. Hettich, supra note 3, at 1479. European cultural concerns have also
animated a string of recent Trans-Atlantic clashes between US e-commerce businesses and
European regulators. See, e.g., Paul McNamara, Conviction of Google Execs in Italy Sheer
Madness; Case That Never Should Have Been Brought Ends with Jail Sentences, NETWORK
WORLD (Feb. 24, 2010, 8:01 AM), available at http://www.networkworld.com/community/
node/57889; Steve Lohr & James Kanter, Cultural Bent Hangs Over Oracle's Battle for Sun,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.coml/2009/l 1/1 1/technology/
companies/l loracle.html? r-1&ref-sunmicrosystemsinc; Here We Go Again: Technology
Firms and Antitrust, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 19, 2009, at 116; Matthew Saltmarsh, Google
Loses in French Copyright Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2009, available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2009/12/19/technology/companies/19google.html; David Gelles & Ben Hall,
Sarkozy Considers Tax on Google, FINANCIAL TIMES, Jan. 8, 2010, available at
http://www.ft.con/cms/s/0/62181b78-fbf7-11de-9c29-00144feab49a.html#axzzl9HzxBo
DE; Anupam Chander, Trade 2.0, 34 YALE J. INT'L L. 281 (2009) (describing Yahoo! case as
exemplifying culture clash between France and the United States). While these examples
span a gamut of disparate issues, the cultural subtext is never far beneath the surface.
54 See VooN, supra note 2, at 51-53 (summarizing proposals); Burri-Nenova, supra note
52, at 46-49 (same).
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cabin the scope of cultural exceptionalism to minimize the conflict. Given
the entrenched polarization of this debate, such "split-the-baby" formulas
end up being equally unpalatable to all sides. The WTO's consensus
rulemaking affords them slim prospect of adoption.
This Article takes a different approach. It takes a step back from the
legal complexity engulfing the cultural exception to address a threshold
question that few have asked: Does trade in audiovisual goods necessarily
reduce cultural diversity?55 In fact, South Korea's "Korean Wave" offers a
compelling example to the contrary that underscores the extent to which
Eurocentric bias that has distorted the "trade and culture" debate. South
Korea's experience-bolstered by case studies from other diverse film
industries in India, Hong Kong, and Nigeria-reveals the potential to
realize diversity through trade. These audiovisual success stories reveal
untapped global demand for diverse content, belying the received wisdom
that catering to export markets required stripping content of cultural
specificity. Nigeria's experience also highlights the game-changing
potential of digital technologies. Set against the failure of European
cultural protection, these case studies in diverse filmmaking argue strongly
for a reconceptualization of cultural protection policy. In a recent
submission, the U.S. Trade Representative gestured in this direction.56
However, a full articulation of such an alternative vision still awaits.
This Article undertakes that challenge. It advocates an approach to
cultural protection that embraces global markets as opportunities rather than
threats. Such an approach would defuse much of the tension that pervades
the cultural exception debate and-crucially-would obviate the need for
changes in WTO law. Most importantly, a decentralized, market-oriented
approach patterned on Korea's example would better achieve the
underlying goals of cultural protectionism and avoid significant drawbacks
of European patronage regimes. Before elaborating further on the Korean
alternative, it is therefore worth exploring why European patronage falls
short of the mark.
II. A CRITIQUE OF EUROPEAN STATE PATRONAGE
Governments around the world protect their audiovisual industries.
However, the tool kit of protectionism was pioneered in Europe, and
Europeans remain among its most dedicated practitioners. European
protectionism is based on a "state patronage" model, whereby the state
assumes a dominant role in funding audiovisual production. State
patronage has become the leading model for cultural protection even
5 For a notable exception, see TYLER COWEN, CREATIVE DESTRUCTION: How
GLOBALIZATION IS CHANGING THE WORLD'S CULTURES 14-18 (2002) (arguing that trade can
stimulate cultural diversity as well as undermine it).
5 See Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services, Communication from the
United States: Audiovisual and Related Services, S/CSS/W/21 (Dec. 18, 2000).
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beyond Europe.
European patronage regimes tend to be suspicious of market forces
and inclined toward dirigiste policies. They emphasize production over
distribution, and bureaucracy is pervasive. Patronage regimes also breed
elitism and insularity. At their worst, they foster essentialized notions of
authenticity or outright censorship.
Most fundamentally, however, state patronage has failed as an engine
of cultural vitality. Consider the example of France. Heir to a glorious
legacy of cultural achievement, France has emerged a leading champion of
cultural protection. The French government lavishes subsidies on its
national culture to the tune of $4.4 billion per year.57 However, for all its
spending, France's creative industries continue to cede ground, and its
58
cultural preeminence recedes further into memory.
The decline of French cinema has been particularly galling. 59 France
invented modern commercial cinema and dominated the global industry in
its infancy. France's 1960s "New Wave" directors revolutionized
filmmaking again, earning lasting international prestige. As French cinema
lost ground to Hollywood, however, the French government introduced an
array of policies to prop up its domestic industry. France today operates
Europe's most comprehensive and sophisticated audiovisual patronage
regime. French film subsidies account for almost half the total spent by
European governments; its film industry remains the largest in Continental
Europe.60 Yet, the more the French government has intervened, the farther
behind its filmmakers have slipped.
In the 1930s, France's "golden era" of filmmaking, domestic studios
held their own against Hollywood with minimal state support. The 1960s
"New Wave" directors received some state aid, covering around 20% of
production costs and the remaining 80% came from market revenues. By
the late 1980s, this ratio had inverted. French filmmakers could count on
direct and indirect subsidies to defray as much as 80% of their costs.6 1 Yet,
as Figure 1 shows, domestic films have steadily lost market share to
Hollywood in recent decades. Tellingly, the decade in which subsidies rose
the most steeply-the 1980s-is also the period when market share decline
was the greatest.
5 Donald Morrison, The Death of French Culture, TIME, Nov. 21, 2007, at 71 (noting
France spends five times more on culture than the United States as a share of GDP).
5 See id.
5 See Jonathan Buchsbaum, "The Exception Culturelle Is Dead." Long Live Cultural
Diversity: French Cinema and the New Resistance, 47 FRAMEWORK: J. CINEMA & MEDIA 5,
16 (2006) (describing cinema as most "valued asset" in France's cultural patrimony).
60 See COwEN, supra note 55, at 78 (stating "problems of European cinema are, in large
part, the problems of French cinema").
6 DALE, supra note 33, at 123. See also Tyler Cowen, French Kiss-Off How
Protectionism Has Hurt French Films, REASON MAG., July 1998, http://www.reason.com/
news/show/30691.html.
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Figure 1: Share ofFrench Domestic Film Market
France is not alone in this predicament. French patronage has been
widely replicated across Europe, both at the national and European levels.
202
Other European film industries have fared far worse.62 A legacy of artistic
and commercial success has given way to "stale and uninspiring works"
that have forsaken mainstream audiences for the self-imposed ghetto of art-
house cinema. 63 Defenders of European patronage argue that the results
would be even worse without government action. In fact, patronage
policies may be doing as much harm as good.64
A. Lack of Market Orientation
By attenuating the link between filmmakers and paying audiences,
Europe has created a "subsidy trap" that marginalizes much of European
film into commercial irrelevancy.6 Filmmakers no longer respond to box
office im eratives but instead depend on government largesse to fund their
projects. The result has been a steep decline in revenues. Between 1960
and 1995, the annual box office earnings of European films declined by
62 See DALE, supra note 33, at 120-21 (charting comparative declines).
63 Victor Henning & Andre Alpar, Public Aid Mechanisms in Feature Film Production:
The EU MEDIA Plus Programme, 27 MEDIA CULTURE & Soc'Y 229, 231 (2005).
64 Emmanuel Cocq & Patrick Messerlin, The French Audiovisual Policy: Impact and
Compatibility with Trade Negotiations, 233 Hamburgisches Welt-Wirtschafts-Archiv, 18
(2003) (accusing patronage of destroying "the culture it was meant to protect").
65 DALE, supra note 33, at 225.
66 See Jonathan Buchsbaum, After GATT- Has the Revival ofFrench Cinema Ended?, 23
FRENCH POL. CULTURE & Soc'Y 34, 42 (2005) (condemning culture of dependency that
ensures mediocrity).
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88% in real terms, falling from $4 billion to $.5 billion, while Hollywood's
European box office take remained at a constant $2.5 billion.6 7
Several factors have reinforced this decline in commercial filmmaking.
First, beginning in the 1960s, European governments began to deliberately
steer subsidies toward "cultural" films at the expense of commercial
genres.68 Indeed, to get funded, film-makers often "have to prove that their
project isn't 'commercial."' 69 Unsurprisingly, the films that get funded this
way rarely succeed at the box office.
Second, the ready availability of patronage to front production costs
has changed European filmmaking from an exercise in venture capitalism to
a more self-indulgent mentality in which market imperatives take a back
seat.n In addition to government grants, filmmakers can count on ready
funding from television: European governments typically require TV
stations to devote a share of gross revenues to backing European films.
While nominally exchanged for pre-purchased broadcast rights, such forced
"investment" amounts to an indirect subsidy in which payments greatly
exceed market value.72
Patronage elevates producers and directors over other players in the
industry. The result is a fragmented industry dominated by inde endents
yielding a high volume of relatively low-budget productions. Such
67 DALE, supra note 33, at 173.
68 DALE, supra note 33, at 177. Not all subsidies are selective in this way. Some
countries also award "automatic" subsidies tied to box office performance. However, across
Europe, the thrust of state aid shifted sharply to cultural selective subsidies from the late
1960s through 1980s. DALE, supra note 33, at 167, 173-74, 183. See also infra note 369.
69 DALE, supra note 33, at 226.
70 Such selective subsidies are typically awarded in the form of soft loans repayable only
to the extent the film makes money. In the early 1960s, the repayment rate in France was
around 40-50%, a figure that had dropped to 10-15% by the end of the decade. DALE, supra
note 33, at 187; Patrick A. Messerlin & Emmanuel Cocq, Preparing Negotiations in
Services: EC Audiovisuals in the Millenium Round 22 (Sept. 1999) (unpublished manuscript
presented at the World Services Congress 1999 on "Services: Generating Global Growth
and Opportunity," Atlanta). The repayment rate for Europe as a whole is less than 10%.
European ThinkTank on Film and Film Policy, Public Policies for Film: Challenges in a
Changing Context, 6 (Aug. 2008) (paper presented at the Council of Europe Film Policy
Forum on "Shaping Policies for the Cinema of Tomorrow," Kark6w) [hereinafter European
ThinkTank].
71 This lack of market discipline is reflected in the much higher proportion of European
film projects that proceed from development into production. By comparison, Hollywood
green-lights fewer projects and devotes far more resources (10% of overall budget, as
opposed to 2% in Europe) to evaluating and refining projects at the pre-production stage.
Henning & Alpar, supra note 63, at 238.
72 See Buchsbaum, supra note 59, at 18; DALE, supra note 33, at 227. While television
pre-purchases typically pursue a mix of both cultural and commercial aims, their effect is to
distract filmmakers from a focus on the box office. See infra notes 114-74 and
accompanying text.
n Henning & Alpar, supra note 63, at 235-36; Allen J. Scott, French Cinema: Economy,
Policy and Place in the Making of a Cultural-Products Industry, 17 THEORY CULTURE &
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fragmentation hampers the competitiveness of European film.7 4  Worse,
front-loaded funding removes the incentive of producers to even try for box
office success." Independent filmmakers earn their living by taking a cut
from the pre-financing packages they assemble. With little or no "skin in
the game," they remain relatively indifferent to the fate of the end
products, 7 6 as do their government and television paymasters. 77 As a result,
almost a third of French feature films receives little or no theatrical
78
exhibition, with 20% relegated directly to television.
Compared to their US counterparts, producers are also far less apt to
rein in directorial fancies that undermine commercial appeal. 79 As a result,
European films have earned a reputation for emphasizing talk over action
and intellectual rather than emotional appeal.8  At the same time, the
escalating budget of popular films has meant that even commercially-
minded independents struggle to compete for exhibition slots.8 1 Moreover,
because micro studios lack the wherewithal to amortize losses and gains
across multiple projects, they are vulnerable to highly unpredictable
demand for creative products.8 Eighty percent of European studios make
Soc'Y 1, 5 (2000) (ascribing lack of integration in French film industry to "comparatively
easy access" that independent producers have to state-sponsored funding); see also European
ThinkTank, supra note 70, at 11 (describing aim of independent producers to make as many
films as possible).
74 Small budgets means less investment in development, production, promotion, and
merchandising tie-ins, all of which contribute directly to market success. Henning & Alpar,
supra note 63, at 236-38.
7 Scott, supra note 73, at 30 (describing producers as more concerned with "obtaining
financial subsidies than . .. attracting audiences"); Buchsbaum, supra note 59, at 12
(describing producers' "logic of pre-financing" instead of box office results).
76 DALE, supra note 33, at 227; Buchsbaum, supra note 66, at 46 (describing "casino 6 la
frangaise, where the players never lose").
7 Bizarrely, French law forbids television channels from acquiring a direct financial
interest in the box office revenues of films they fund. The patron's goal is instead to fund
films that impress the cultural establishment and capture prestigious festival prizes. DALE,
supra note 33, at 231-32. Such indifference to commercial considerations begins at film
schools whose instruction emphasizes critical theory over practical economics. Id. at 206-
07.
78 Messerlin & Cocq, supra note 70, at 8 n.13.
79 See Reed Martin, The French Film Industry: A Crisis ofArt and Commerce, 30 CoLUM
J. WORLD Bus. 6, 13 (1995). In part, such indulgence reflects the European "cult of the
auteur," which glorifies directors as creative masterminds. Scott, supra note 73, at 6.
However, institutional structures reinforce this practice including the award of selective
subsidies directly to directors, and copyright laws that vest directors with creative control.
DALE, supra note 33, at 187, 200-01.
80 Cowen, supra note 61 (describing French films as the cinematic equivalents of the
nouveau roman, a style of fiction that emphasizes introspection at the expense of narrative
development).
8 Henning & Alpar, supra note 63, at 237.
82 See Messerlin & Cocq, supra note 70, at 5 (describing volume production as a form of
risk management).
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only one movie per year. 83 Accordingly, many play it safe with paint-by-
number formula films made for television and purchased as cheap filler to
meet domestic content quotas.84
Indeed, much of European cinema has effectivel become a made-for-
television enterprise-hardly a recipe for quality.8  Even by this low
standard, Europe's recent output fails to measure up. Television stations in
France tellingly prefer to rerun classic pre-patronage films during
primetime hours instead of airing more recent works. Meanwhile, newer
films struggle to achieve secondary broadcasts once their pre-purchase
rights have been exercised-content quotas notwithstanding.86
Meanwhile, overnment subsidies have all but crowded out private
financing options. Europe's few remaining commercial studios (mostly
French) do produce a clutch of big budget films in-house. Europe also has
more than its share of giant media conglomerates who remain active in
distributing audiovisual content. Tellingly, however, these private
companies prefer to direct their external investment into Hollywood co-
productions rather than participate in Europe's state-sponsored film
sector.88  This leaves independent filmmakers few alternative sources of
funding, except to turn to Hollywood. Doing so, however, typically means
foregoing all the benefits of government support-a price few are willing to
accept.8
Far from rescuing European film, subsidies have left the industry a
shadow of its former commercial self. The main achievement of European
patronage has been to replace private funding with a state-sponsored
dependency on subsidies. 90 Granted, lack of commercial success does not
necessarily mean that patronage has failed to fulfill its cultural goals.
However, the chronic failure of European films to attract audiences serves
as a reality check that raises questions as to cultural relevancy.
B. Emphasis on Production over Distribution
The ripple effects of European patronage reach across the entire
audiovisual industry. Fragmented production and shrinking audiences
83 Henning & Alpar, supra note 63, at 236.
84 See infra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
8 The captive market created by European domestic content quotas only exacerbates the
problem. Messerlin & Cocq, supra note 70, at 11.
86 Id. at 7-8, 10-11. Such preferences persist despite the "massive" rate at which the
classic films are continually rerun and despite the strong preference for "new releases" in
other markets. Id.; Buchsbaum, supra note 59, at 16.
87 See DALE, supra note 33, at 201-02 (describing how the availability of private bank
loans and completion bond vanished in wake of public sector alternatives).
8 Id. at 127, 164.
89 See infra note 185 and accompanying text.
90 The patient remains alive on life support, but its prospects of recovery are far from
sanguine. Henning & Alpar, supra note 63, at 241.
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create a vicious cycle of diminished revenues and reduced competitiveness.
These problems have been compounded by a neglect of Europe's
distribution sector. The vast majority of European film subsidies go
directly to production, paying filmmakers to chum out movies without
worrying about what happens once they are made. 91 Moreover, European
policies on distribution actually make matters worse.
Distribution has long "been considered the weak link in the [European]
cinema industry." 92 In Hollywood, vertically integrated studio-distributors
invest in films and actively promote their release. Such distributors capture
valuable market feedback on "consumer trends and marketing
possibilities."9  Distributors are "natural figures to have a direct interest in
the promotion of films and in their success in theaters."94  Yet European
distributors have been largely marginalized.9 ' To be effective, distributors
require organizational capacity and geographic scope, both of which benefit
from economies of scale. 9 6 In championing national filmmaking, European
patronage has balkanized its distribution section and prevented the
horizontal and vertical integration that its film industries desperately need
to be globally competitive.
Other distribution-related aspects of European cinema have suffered
from similar neglect. A lack of investment in movie houses has led to
rundown venues that deter audiences.98  Europe was relatively late in
building modem multiplex theaters and lags the U.S. in digital projectors. 99
European films also suffer from meager promotional budgets compared to
their well-funded Hollywood rivals.' Instead, European films are forced
9' Europe-wide, around 80% of public funding goes directly to support production of
individual films. European ThinkTank, supra note 70, at 8. Only around 7% goes to support
theatrical film distribution with slight additional funding for promotions (mostly at film
festivals). Id. at 8, 10.
92 Buchsbaum, supra note 66, at 38. See also DALE, supra note 33, at 158.
9 Scott, supra note 73, at 4. Such market intelligence can inform development of film
projects, a process which European cinema underemphasizes. Henning & Alpar, supra note
63, at 238.
94 Buchsbaum, supra note 66, at 38.
9 See id. at 38, 42; DALE, supra note 33, at 227; European ThinkTank, supra note 70, at
10. In the 1980s, French distributors accounted for around 30% of film financing. By the
late 1990s, their contribution had fallen to under 6%. During this same period, financing
from television pre-purchases almost quadrupled from around 10% to as much as 40%.
Cocq & Messerlin, supra note 64, at 14; Buchsbaum, supra note 66, at 38.
96 Scott, supra note 73, at 4. The ability of distributors to bridge the gap between
producers and markets is particularly vital where production is fragmented as in Europe. Id.
9 Henning & Alpar, supra note 63, at 236; European ThinkTank, supra note 70, at 22.
98 DALE, supra note 33, at 173.
9 European ThinkTank, supra note 70, at 14; Anne Jackel, The Inter/Nationalism of
French Film Policy, 15 MOD. & CONTEMP. FR. 21, 23 (2007).
100 On average European movies devote 3-6% of their budget to advertising compared to
US averages of 30% or more. Compare Henning & Alpar, supra note 63, at 238, with
MOTION PICTURE Ass'N OF AMERICA, ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY MARKET STATISTics 7
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to rely on reviews by critics to generate publicity, reinforcinF their tendency
to value praise from cultural elites over popular audiences. o
European patronage also affects the distribution sector directly.
European patronage is partly funded by a tax on box office tickets, which
increases prices, further depressing sales.1 02 Moreover, while Europe has
started to steer more aid to the distribution sectors, much of this funding has
proven counter-productive. An emphasis on art-house cinema and film
festivals contributes to the marginalization of European film. 103 Propping
up national distributors reinforces industry fragmentation.104 Governments
have also chronically neglected funding for publicity and often micro-
manage film marketing in intrusive and sometimes perverse ways.10 5 Most
notably, France imposes an outright ban on television advertising for
motion pictures, which denies French movies one of their best means to
attract audiences to new releases.10 6
Domestic content quotas for European television have also had
perverse implications for European film distribution. 07  Such quotas
effectively create a captive market for European film, accounting for half its
revenues. os Combined with forced investment in broadcast rights, such
mandates, in theory, afford European film access to mass audiences in their
living room.
In practice, however, reliance on television has proven a mixed
blessing. The pre-purchase deals that TV executives dangle distract
filmmakers from focusing on theatrical distribution. Moreover, it
encourages smaller productions that are unlikely to be theatrically
(2007).
]o1 DALE, supra note 33, at 179-80 (describing European critics' scorn for popular
filmmaking).
102 DALE, supra note 33, at 172-73; Messerlin & Cocq, supra note 70, at 12
103 DALE, supra note 33, at 177, 221. France earmarks subsidies for "art house movie
theaters," "challenging films," and "venues in underserved parts of the country." CENTRE
NATIONAL DU CINEMA ET DE L'IMAGE ANIMtE, RESULTS 2008: CNC REPORT #310 147 (2009)
[hereinafter CNC REPORT #310]. France also stages more film festivals than any other
country. Jackel, supra note 99, at 24. Festivals are also proliferating across the European
continent. European ThinkTank, supra note 70, at 23 (more than 700 annually). While film
festivals can facilitate marketing and distribution deals for mainstream cinema, crossovers
between the two realms are far from assured. Festivals cater to hard-core cinephiles, and
their limited screenings hardly substitute for mainstream theatrical release. Id.
104 Henning & Alpar, supra note 63, at 242-43; DALE, supra note 33, at 158.
105 See Buchsbaum, supra note 66, at 39-41 (giving examples of dirigiste regulation);
Messerlin & Cocq, supra note 70, at 7 (same). France devotes a paltry .3% of its film
subsidies to publicity and the European average is only .6%. European ThinkTank, supra
note 70, at 5.
106 Henning & Alpar, supra note 63, at 229, 238.
107 The European Union's Television Without Frontiers Directive requires a minimum of
50% of broadcast hours be devoted to airing European-made content. See infra note 382.
108 COWEN, supra note 55, at 78; DALE, supra note 33, at 170-71.
82
HeinOnline  -- 31 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 82 2011
Beyond Culture vs. Commerce
31:63 (2011)
competitive at the box office. Because television stations have enormous
content holes to plug, their priority is finding low cost filler to meet their
quotas, rather than maximizing audiences for any particular show.' 09 As
result, television pours funds into a multiplicity of low-budget productions,
most of which are destined for late-night broadcast slots with scant
prospects of an audience." 0
In effect, television has become the primary distribution vehicle for
European film, serving as a substitute for theatrical release rather than a
complement to it."' Trading box office for TV has served European film
poorly. While television surpasses cinema in total revenues, the value per
unit content is much lower. Film exhibition is not only a more prestigious,
premium-value sector in its own right, but it also sits atop a cascading
stream of downstream revenues.112 A successful movie launch generates
substantial publicity and popular attention that in turn drives DVD sales,
pay-per-view, soundtracks, video games, theme parks, and product
merchandising. Studio libraries of hit films pay dividends lasting for
decades." 3  Moreover, domestic box office success can be crucial to
securing export prospects.
By contrast, television broadcasts (even primetime) do not offer nearly
the same payoffs. TV confers a much lower profile, less engaged
audiences, is less receptive to innovation, and does not open doors to
foreign distribution in the way that theatrical releases can.114  The
economics of television center on delivering high volumes of standardized
fare to intersperse between paid advertising. 1 Made-for-television movies
09 Messerlin & Cocq, supra note 70, at 11. At one time, for example, Canal Plus, a
French pay-TV station, invested in 80% of France's annual film production. Buchsbaum,
supra note 59, at 18.
no Buchsbaum, supra note 59, at 16. French TV stations are actually required to
earmark a percentage of their pre-purchases to small-budget films, the threshold amount for
which has not been adjusted for inflation. Id. at 12-13.
11 See COWEN, supra note 55, at 78-79; DALE, supra note 33, at 204. In essence, the
European film industry has become a made-for-TV enterprise. DALE, supra note 33, at 170-
71. By contrast, television remains a minor facet of Hollywood's total revenue streams. Id.
at 234; COWEN, supra note 55, at 79 .
112 DALE, supra note 33, at 25.
" Id at 19-35; European ThinkTank, supra note 70, at 9.
114 Hyangsun Lee, An Economic Analysis of Protective Film Policies: A Case Study of
the Korean Screen Quota System 11 (May 25, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/pl4967 index.html. See also COWEN, supra note 55, at
79. Watching TV is a more passive activity than going to the movies. Many TV viewers
simply watch whatever is on (or channel surf) without devoting their entire attention. The
quality and production values of TV shows are also significantly lower than that of
theatrically released film. TV coverage also generates much less media coverage than
movies do. Id. at 78-79.
115 See DALE, supra note 33, at 3; Fabrice Lalevde & Florence L6vy-Hartmann, The
Support for the French Cinematographic Production: Who Benefits from the French
"Cultural Exception"? 12 (Groupe d'Economie Mondiale A Sciences Po, Working Paper
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rarely generate works of lasting cultural influence. 116 As such, TV quotas
divert film production to a less prestigious outlet that drastically reduces
both downstream revenues and cultural impact.'17
By hitching its fortune to the television industry, European film has
also become dependent on a shrinking revenue base as proliferating channel
capacity and competition from other digital media fragment audiences
depressing advertising revenues. 118 Moreover, the switch to "on demand"
delivery platforms threatens to render content quotas obsolete.1 1 9 Theatrical
film exhibition is not facing the same imminent threat. 120 Yet, by failing to
invest in new production and distribution technologies to enhance the
theatrical experience, Europe risks falling further and further behind
Hollywood.' Television represents a dangerous distraction from that
challenge.
C. Centralized Bureaucracies
Compounding its other flaws, state patronage has spawned red-tape
and inefficiency. At best, the "bureaucratization of culture" serves as a
dampener on innovation. 122  At worst, patronage invites bureaucratic
meddling, industry capture, or outright corruption.
Culturally selective subsidies require extensive bureaucracies to
establish criteria, procedures, and personnel to sort through competing
applications and identify worthy recipients. Multiple sources of patronage
have bred a proliferation of process. In addition to state mechanisms,
television stations have their own review mechanisms, as do the patronage
regimes emerging at the European supranational level. The Council of
Europe's Eurimage and the European Community's Media programs now
administer "a vast superstructure of public funding, almost as
No. GEM WP-2007-01, 2007); Isabelle Vanderschelden, Strategies for a
'Transnational'/French Popular Cinema, 15 MOD. & CONTEMP. FR. 37, 41 (2007).
116 COWEN, supra note 55, at 78-79. Not only is the content quality lower, but it is less
likely to have cultural impact owing to the passive nature of the medium. Id. at 78.
117 Some see television exposure as detracting from the reputation of European film
overall. See Buchsbaum, supra note 66, at 37 (describing "banalization" of French film by
virtue of constant TV exposure); id. at 48 (noting a film critic's concerns over TV's
"maleficent influence").
118 European ThinkTank, supra note 70, at 12.
119 Once consumers have more than a few choices, they can effectively watch what they
want, whatever the quota target might be. Moreover, with non-linear content delivery ("on
demand"), the broadcasters no longer even control the content on any particular channel.
120 Although television led to an initial decline in movie attendance, Hollywood has
fought back with higher budget productions, special effects, and upgraded exhibition
technologies (e.g., surround sound, 3-D) to keep its edge. Moreover, cinema-going remains
a social ritual for which no home viewing system can adequately substitute. One-
dimensional: Hollywood in the Recession, ECONOMIST, July 11, 2009, at 63.
121 Scott, supra note 73, at 28.
122 TYLER COWEN, IN PRAISE OF COMMERCIAL CULTURE 40 (1998).
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comprehensive as national funding systems."1 2 3 Many European regions
offer sub-national subsidies.12 4  As with most bureaucracies, patronage
regimes tend to grow more complex over time. Each new program brings
another layer of red-tape.125
These multiple levels of committee review represent "the true
'battlefield' of European cinematic culture." 2 6 France alone has more than
160 forms of support, including 50 dedicated to feature-length films.127 The
official guide to these programs spans 318 pages.12 8 In their "opacity and
complexity," such "Byzantine" structures reward insiders and repeat players
who know how to work the system.' 29  Committee members often lack
"either the time or the skills to properly evaluate scripts and therefore
depend above all on direct acquaintance with the applicant or personal
recommendations." 3 0 In many cases, awards go to those with the strongest
lobby rather than the best ideas.131 Patronage becomes a spoils system
exploited b ' a "quasi-rentier" class that, at worst, devolves into outright
corruption.
Even where committee members act with the best of intentions, the
results can skew in undesirable directions. Committee members often bring
conflicting artistic and ideological agendas. The need to balance these
diverging visions, as well as an intrinsic conservatism, leads decisions to
gravitate toward bland, consensus picks.'33  Committees "are mainly
123 DALE, supra note 33, at 221; Henning & Alpar, supra note 63, at 234.
124 Germany's federal system has always devolved cultural policies to its Ldnde. DALE,
supra note 33, at 189-92. However, even centralized states such as France increasingly
feature regional aid initiatives for filmmakers.
125 Government has a finger in every pie from film education to archives; state patronage
now extends to every phase and facet of the audiovisual lifecycle from script development to
post-production to export assistance. See Scott, supra note 73, at 12; DALE, supra note 33, at
231.
126 DALE, supra note 33, at 231.
127 Lalev6e & Ldvy-Hartmann, supra note 115, at 6. In addition, France and other
European countries have entered into numerous bilateral agreements supporting international
co-productions, each of which has unique provisions and prerequisites. Taking advantage of
these agreements typically requires advice of legal counsel. DALE, supra note 33, at 185.
128 Messerlin & Cocq, supra note 70, at 8 n.12.
129 Buchsbaum, supra note 66, at 42; Cocq & Messerlin, supra note 64, at 14, 22; DALE,
supra note 33, at 233.
130 DALE, supra note 33, at 229. Dale explains that committee members are often
political appointees who lack direct experience in industry they oversee. Id. at 128.
131 Id. at 233. See Harvey B. Feigenbaum, Regulating the Media in the United States and
France, 27 J. ARTS MGMT. L. & Soc'Y 283, 289 (1998).
132 Scott, supra note 73, at 31; Messerlin & Cocq, supra note 70, at 4; DALE, supra note
33, at 233 (describing abuses ranging from "the casting couch" to bribery kickbacks). Italy,
in particular, has had notorious corruption scandals related to audiovisual funding. Id. at
197-98, 233.
133 See Cocq & Messerlin, supra note 64, at 12. Tyler Cowen explains how multiple
vetoes on committee cancel each other out. This conservative tendency is reinforced by
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concerned to know that the project has the right 'cultural' feel to it, and is
not likely to ruffle any important feathers." 34 As a result, the system tends
to resist infusion of new blood and/or radical visions that might keep
European cinema fresh and relevant.135
To reverse such tendencies to stifle cultural dynamism, reforms in
recent decades have sought to help independent filmmakers and nurture
new talent but had mixed success. 36 Directing funding to independents
reinforces industry fragmentation. France also earmarks special subsidies
for "first films" by new directors. Yet, Cocq and Messerlin calculate that
new directors receiving "first film" funding from 1987 through 1996, in
fact, fared no better in establishing long-term careers than those who did
not. 137
In fact, tinkering with the European patronage system may be doing
more harm than good. The continuing industry decline has prompted a
steady stream of reports and studies proposing various reforms. 13 The
standard response of policy-makers has been to implement
recommendations for new programs while ignoring calls to overhaul the old
ones (which vested interests inevitably oppose).139  Each new change
accountability to politicians: fear of provoking political heat has a chilling effect. TYLER
COWEN, GOOD & PLENTY: THE CREATIVE SUCCESSES OF AMERICAN ARTS 135 (2006).
134 DALE, supra note 33, at 229. Such distortions affect television pre-purchases as well,
which is expected to serve a public "cultural" remit. Id. at 204-05, 231. While nominally
private, commissioning editors at TV stations remain subservient to the government's
cultural mission. See id at 234 (describing government influence over appointment of TV
editors). Moreover, the bias toward bland uniformity is particularly pronounced in the case
of television. The "bulk rate" mentality of television programming strongly favors
standardized offerings that hew to well-trodden formulae over more experimental fare.
Vanderschelden, supra note 115, at 41; Lalev6e & Ldvy-Hartmann, supra note 115, at 12.
135 While Europe's cultural establishment may champion advante garde art, it tends to be
hostile to truly revolutionary visions. COWEN, supra note 133, at 99-100. Instead, the
relatively few newcomers who break in tend to be drawn from a narrow circle of
metropolitan elites who went to the "right" schools and can hobnob with the cultural
aristocracy. DALE, supra note 33, at 233. Of course, Hollywood has its A-lists and film
royalty as well. However, the boundaries are more permeable, and mobility is constant. The
bottom-line question is: "Can you make money for us," not "Did you go to the right school
and wear the right tie?"
136 For example, EU television quotas mandate that 10% of programming be produced by
"independents." See Hettich, supra note 3, at 1483. Additionally, a percentage of television
pre-purchases is reserved for "small-budget" films. See Buchsbaum, supra note 59, at 13.
Yet failure to index the threshold amount to inflation has led such allocations to steadily
decline in real terms.
137 Cocq & Messerlin, supra note 64, at 19-23.
138 Buchsbaum, supra note 66, at 38-40. Such audiovisual analyses have become a
cottage industry. In France alone, between 2000 and 2006, no less than 17 comprehensive
industry studies were undertaken (not counting parliamentary inquiries). Lalevie & L6vy-
Hartmann, supra note 115, at 5.
139 Lalev6e & Ldvy-Hartmann, supra note 115, at 5 ("The new instruments overlay the
old ones ... intertwined without any rationality."). See also Messerlin & Cocq, supra note
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engenders unintended consequences, which in turn demands further
tweaks. 14 0 As new programs pile atop the old, a system of mindboggling
complexity has emerged as a barrier to entry in its own right.
On paper, such complexity may give the illusion of decentralized
funding and the promise of diversified access 41; in practice it does the
opposite. As funding pours through an ever broader array of spigots,
outlays from any single source have diminished. Filmmakers, therefore,
have to assemble a patchwork of grants and loans from multiple sources,
142
each requiring its own application process and committee review.
Whereas Hollywood studios provide one-stop-shop solutions for financing,
production, and distribution, aspiring European filmmakers must navigate
an increasingly Kafkaesque maze in which applying for funding consumes
more time than making the actual movies. 4 1 Moreover, because the same
establishment figures sit on multiple committees, the potential diversity
benefits of parallel funding are never realized. Instead, such administrative
redundancy acts as a barrier to entry, stifling creativity.
As a result, European cinema has failed to refresh its talent base and
blunted its innovative edge.14 5 The once-revolutionary techniques of New
Wave filmmaking have become hackneyed clich6s.146  Meanwhile,
Hollywood provides a constant lure, siphoning off European talent and
leaving behind an aging cadre of filmmakers.14 Between 1960 and 1993,
the average age of French directors increased from 28 to 55 years old. 148
70, at 4 (describing resistance to reform).
140 Buchsbaum, supra note 66, at 41; Buchsbaum, supra note 59, at 12.
141 See Scott, supra note 73, at 17 (finding that detailed production outcomes in French
cinema are in the hands of "many decentralized decision-makers").
142 DALE, supra note 33, at 226-29. In this way, the fragmentation of patronage mirrors
the fragmentation of industry.
143 See also Joongi Kim, The Viability of Screen Quotas in Korea: The Cultural
Exception under the International Trade Regime, 26 KOREAN J. INT'L & COMP. L. 199, 232
(1998) ("Film makers will devote their energies to lobbying instead of making good films.");
DALE, supra note 33, at 225-26. Applicants are rewarded for their public relations skills,
while quirky geniuses are overlooked. COWEN, supra note 133, at 100.
144 See DALE, supra note 33, at 232-33. The more committees a filmmaker has to get
past to secure funding the less the opportunity for truly innovative, idiosyncratic visions to
survive the gauntlet of bureaucratic review. See also Mark Schultz, Creative Development:
Helping Poor Countries by Building Creative Industries, 97 Ky. L.J. 79, 113 (2008)
(explaining how bureaucratic mandates "'crowdout' the more creative, intrinsic motivations
that drive good art").
145 Cocq & Messerlin, supra note 64, at 22-23; DALE, supra note 33, at 161; COWEN,
supra note 122, at 39-40. Some would argue that institutional culture by nature is
oxymoronic. COWEN, supra note 133, at 143 (citing Dubuffet).
146 Martin, supra note 79, at 9.
147 DALE, supra note 33, at 159 (describing how frustration with obstacles in Europe
leads young filmmakers to vote with their feet); Martin, supra note 79, at 10. Over 40% of
name directors in Hollywood come from Europe. DALE, supra note 33, at 161.
148 DALE, supra note 33, at 161; Martin, supra note 79, at 16. Italy's talent drain has
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So far, this story could be taken as a cautionary tale about dirigiste
state policies blunting market competitiveness. In purely market terms, it is
easy to argue that patronage amounts to a negative value proposition. 4 9
However, it is worth emphasizing that the costs of patronage go beyond
those quantifiable in economic terms. Patronage regimes do not just
produce culture less efficiently, but they also affect the kind of works
produced, raising obvious concerns over state censorship.
D. Discriminatory Funding
By nature, patronage regimes represent an exercise in positive
censorship. By funding some artists but not others, the state determines
whose voices get heard." 0  As a natural instrument of state control,
audiovisual patronage inherently invites authoritarian abuse.'5 1  In some
countries, the link between cultural funding and state ideology can be
blatant.152 Even where cultural protection is framed in ostensibly non-
ideological terms, the very process of selecting works deemed worthy of
state support invites value-judgments about speech content that are deeply
problematic, particularly where-as in Europe-the government enjoys a
virtual monopoly over audiovisual funding.' T Accusations of censorship
been even more severe. DALE, supra note 33, at 161.
149 Command and control economics loses to free market is hardly headline news. Nor is
the notion that trade protection breeds inefficiency.
Iso DALE, supra note 33, at 122. Where government is only one participant in a diverse
cultural marketplace, such concerns can be tolerated. However, under the monopsonistic
conditions of state patronage, the threat to free speech becomes more pressing. As the old
adage goes, "He who pays the piper, calls the tune."
151 Messerlin & Cocq, supra note 70, at 4. It is no accident that Lenin called film "the
most important art form," nor that the totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century lavished
attention on filmic propaganda. Dale, supra note 33, at 182.
152 Venezuela's domestic content quota requires music radio stations to play "traditional
Andean folk music." Sara Miller Llana, Chavez Enforces "Revolution" in Arts, USA
TODAY, Jan. 22, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2007-01-22-chavez-
usat x.htm. Kazakhstan's state-owned film company lavished funds on its "Genghis" movie
to burnish national mythology. David L. Stern, Building Kazakhstan, One Film at a Time,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/24/world/asia/24iht-
kazakh.4.10338362.html? i-2&scp=l&sq=kazahkstan%20khan%20film&st=cse. India
required traditional raga music to be used as soundtracks for Bollywood movies. And,
China freely meddles in domestic content production to serve its ideological agenda. See
Edward Wong, In China, an Attempt at a Hollywood-Style Movie, N.Y. TIMES, June 15,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/16/movies/16empires.html; Mirko Emkvist & Patrik
Strbm, Enmeshed in Games with the Government: Governmental Policies and the
Development of the Chinese Online Game Industry, 3 GAMES & CULTURE 98 (2008). Such
state interventions often advance essentialized notions of authenticity to justify reactionary
repression. See Madhavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN. L. REv. 495, 500-07 (2001)
(describing how by enforcing cultural boundaries, "law has become complicit in the
backlash project" of buttressing cultural orthodoxies from internal dissent)
153 See Schultz, supra note 144, at 112. The dangers of censorship in state funding for
the arts are well-recognized in U.S. First Amendment jurisprudence. Arnold H. Loewy, No
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become inevitable, as a recent scandal in Canada illustrates. 154
While European patronage has escaped overt scandals of this kind, the
lack of transparency in patronage funding decisions hardly invites
confidence. It is widely recognized that state funders exert a conservative
influence on questions of taste and morality and favor projects with overtly
national themes (such as historical dramas).'"' Beyond that, the delegation
of European patronage to its cultural establishment has led to a systematic
distortion of audiovisual expression and the virtual abandonment of certain
film genres.15 6
Cultural subsidies almost never go to detective stories or thrillers-
genres historically favored by European audiences-and these films rarely
get made as a result.157 Obscure symbolism, endless dialogue, intellectual
preening, and introspection are all favored over plot-driven action.iss Such
Strings Attached?: The First Amendment and Tax-Exempt Organizations, 6 FIRST AMEND. L.
REv. 171 (2007). State regulation of patronage awards in Europe presents a far more
disturbing prospect, however, given the lack of alternative funding sources.
154 Canada's conservative government introduced legislation to introduce public morals
criteria into the certification of films as "sufficiently Canadian" (a prerequisite for state
subsidies). Critics denounced the changes as a thinly veiled attempt at state censorship,
warning that "morality" would serve as a proxy for ideological bias, allowing, e.g., films
with gay themes to be rejected as "un-Canadian." Some supporters openly endorsed such
value-based restrictions. Ian Austen, Tax Bill Fuels a Canadian Debate on Film Censorship,
N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/03/movies/
03cens.html; Christians Influence Canadian Film Funding, UNITED PRESS INT'L (Feb. 29,
2008, 11:54 AM), http://www.upi.com/TopNews/20.08/02/29/Christians-influence-
Canadian-film-funding/UPI-52401204304060/.
155 See Cowen, supra note 61 ("France's exports to the United States increasingly feature
period costume dramas [that] . .. require a knowledge of French culture and history to be
appreciated [and reflect] . . . the nationalistic cultural insularity that results from market
protectionism"); DALE, supra note 33, at 117, 229 (conservatism); see also DALE, supra note
33, at 116, 122 (describing corporate tradition of European state culture). But see Jickel,
supra note 99, at 23-24 (arguing bias toward national histories still admits a variety of
perspectives). European-wide patronage programs impose their own distinct biases favoring
so-called "Euro-pudding" films embodying bland pan-European ideals divorced from
identifiable national traditions. Henning & Alpar, supra note 63, at 237; Jickel, supra note
99, at 29.
156 The root cause appears less one of state censorship than of "capture by a small
intellectual elite" whose idiosyncratic preferences determine subsidy allocations.
Feigenbaum, supra note 131, at 284; DALE, supra note 33, at 233-34. Yet the speech
distorting effects are no less troubling.
157 See European ThinkTank, supra note 70, at 16-17. See also Henning & Alpar, supra
note 63, at 231 (describing "abandon[ment] of mainstream cinema"); DALE, supra note 33,
at 168, 180 (lamenting the atrophy of these quintessentially European genres).
158 COWEN, supra note 133, at 99-100. Other biases are perhaps less deliberate. An
aging cadre of directors has meant a dearth of youth-oriented fare, ensuring a declining
audience base. Martin, supra note 79, at 15-16; DALE, supra note 33, at 180. The
centralization of patronage regimes in capital cities results in a preoccupation with
metropolitan concerns. COWEN, supra note 133, at 142. Germany is the exception because
cultural patronage is primarily provincial responsibility. DALE, supra note 33, at 189-91.
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systematic content discrimination may not amount to authoritarian thought-
control, but it is hardly democratic. Audiences are force-fed "cultural
broccoli" whose unpalatability to popular taste is paraded as a badge of
honor vindicating the superiority of elites." 9
Such elitist tendencies perpetuate the pattern of market failure by
limiting the popular appeal of European cinema. This self-inflicted injury
is particularly grievous when it comes to export markets, a sector that
European patronage has consistently neglected.
E. Not Global
A recurrent criticism of European patronage is that it is overly
defensive, concentrating on securing home markets rather than contributing
to global discourse. 160 At first blush, faulting cultural protectionists for
focusing on their home markets is like blaming the Pope for being Catholic.
Some would say the whole point is to foster national culture and keep
globalization at bay. Protectionists also argue that catering to global
audiences compromises the authenticity of the stories being told in that
inside references and plays on language do not translate well. There is
some truth to this. Some cultural content undoubtedly exports better than
others: Hollywood blockbusters emphasize action-oriented storylines with
universal themes to maximize their global appeal. 16 1  Nonetheless, for
Europe, the choice between domestic vs. export markets represents a false
dichotomy.
European cinema need not compete with Hollywood in catering to the
global mass market. High-tech action blockbusters leave plenty of space
for intelligently crafted middlebrow fare.1 62 Indeed, Europe dominated this
niche in the 1960s, when European films became the darling of art house
cinema in the U.S.16 3  The more recent success of the American Indie
Such solipsistic tendencies further limit the popular appeal of European cinema. See DALE,
supra note 33, at 217 ("Seduced by the siren song of juries whose erudite members support
one another in mutual gratification, the [filmmaker] ends up forgetting the basics: to move
the man in the street."). These self-inflicted injuries are particular grievous when it comes to
export markets, a sector which European patronage has consistently neglected.
159 See DALE, supra note 33, at 217 ("Seduced by the siren song of juries whose erudite
members support one another in mutual gratification, the [filmmaker] ends up forgetting the
basics: to move the man in the street."); PIERRE BOURDIEU, DISTINCTION 32-34 (Richard Nice
trans., 1984).
160 See, e.g., Scott, supra note 73, at 17, 27. This criticism points to a tension between
the inward-focused "national sovereignty" view of cultural protection vs. the more global
human heritage rationale. See European ThinkTank, supra note 70, at 8.
161 Martin, supra note 79, at 14 (summarizing attributes of Hollywood movies).
Likewise, a trend toward action films at the expense of comedies reflects the influence of
export markets. More generally, commercial industries stand accused of "dumbing down"
culture to pander to the least common denominator. COWEN, supra note 133, at 12.
162 COWEN, supra note 133, at 99.
163 Martin, supra note 79, at 11. At that time, foreign films accounted for 10% of the US
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movement shows commercial demand remains for smaller films with
sophisticated storytellin .'M However, the Continental Europeans have all-
but ceded this market. Indeed, European films are scarcely shown even
in neighboring European countries. The box office share of European films
in Euro ean markets outside their home country struggles to break single
digits.'
Figure Two shows the decline of inter-European exports.
80,000,000
(m 70,000,000
C
.0 60,000,000
g 50,000,000 ---- Italy
< 40,000,000 - /.. Germany
E 30,000,000 - - France
x 20,000,000
10,000,000
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Figure 2: Declining Sales for Italian, German and French Films in
Neighboring Markets
A myopic focus on domestic audiences all-but ensures competitive
failure. Producing high quality feature-length films requires enormous
fixed cost investments. However, the marginal cost of distributing each
additional copy upon completion is modest. Confining filmmakers to the
home market puts a ceiling on profitability. A smaller revenue base
translates into lower production and marketing budgets, leaving European
filmmakers hopelessly outgunned when it comes to competing with
Hollywood. 6 7 On average, European films attract just one percent of the
box office. Today, European films are lucky to scrape above 1%. Henning & Alpar, supra
note 63, at 232.
164 There are also more distribution options for niche films today. See infra notes 347-52
and accompanying text.
15s Martin, supra note 79, at 12.
166 Henning & Alpar, supra note 63, at 231-32.
167 Scott, supra note 73, at 29; Martin, supra note 79, at 16; COWEN, supra note 133, at
76 ("In essence, Hollywood is now competing with the native European producers in each
individual country, rather than with cross-European exports").
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audience of a typical Hollywood film.168  Government subsidies alone
cannot make up the shortfall, even discounting the costs they impose in
bureaucracy and content discrimination.
It is not that European filmmakers cannot make movies that appeal to
both domestic and foreign audiences. Rather, they have been encouraged
not to try. Prior to 1980, Italy and France used to export over half their
local production; today the ratio is less than one in five.16 9 All the market
distorting effects of patronage regimes described above apply doubly when
it comes to exports. A focus on national stories pitched at insider elites
limits cross-border appeal. 170 Stitching together patronage funding at home
distracts producers from pursuing international distribution.171
Overproduction of domestic films crowds out other European imports.172
Industry fragmentation means small productions lack the budget to compete
internationally.173 Distributors concentrating on "national fortresses" lack
transnational capacity. 174  And national patrons perennially shortchange
175
export promotion.
Efforts to promote European-wide production and distribution have
also suffered the usual drawbacks of patronage regimes: market
distortions, 176 sclerotic bureaucracies, 177 rent-seeking insiders,7 8 and elitist
cultural values.179 Worse, such efforts seem to have perversely reinforced
industry fragmentation.8 0
168 DALE, supra note 33, at 119 (noting that this differential is growing).
16 9 Id. at 169-71.
170 Vanderschelden, supra note 115, at 38; DALE, supra note 33, at 174. Similarly, made-
for-TV movies do not lend themselves to export. COWEN, supra note 133, at 79.
171 DALE, supra note 33, at 230.
172 Messerlin & Cocq, supra note 70, at 10. This becomes a self-reinforcing phenomenon.
While Hollywood celebrities are known everywhere, European audiences increasingly lack
familiarity with the stars of other European cinema so that the latter no longer serve as a
draw. Henning & Alpar, supra note 63, at 229.
17 Henning & Alpar, supra note 63, at 248. Exporting films often requires specialized
expertise in marketing, licensing, addition of dubbing or subtitles that small distributors lack.
European ThinkTank, supra note 70, at 22.
174 Henning & Alpar, supra note 63, at 236; DALE, supra note 33, at 118. Television
broadcasts are similarly confined to national territory. Cocq & Messerlin, supra note 64, at
4.
1s Scott, supra note 73, at 29; European ThinkTank, supra note 70, at 22. Moreover,
efforts at international outreach tend to emphasize film festivals in lieu of mainstream
distribution, which further marginalizes European content. European ThinkTank, supra
note 70, at 22-23.
176 DALE, supra note 33, at 217, 221 (criticizing the European Community Media
programs for reinforcing dependency on state subsidies and distracting filmmakers from
popular audiences).
117 Id. at 221-22.
171 Id. at 210, 221-22.
17 Id. at 211, 221 (criticizing Media), 223 (Eurimage).
180 Henning & Alpar, supra note 63, at 241-43. See also id. at 246-48 (criticizing
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In the early post-war years, European filmmakers used to pool talent
from across the continent through co-productions. In 1965, 45% of
European films were bi- or multi-national ventures, effectively creating the
nucleus of a pan-European cinema.18 1  The rise of national patronage
regimes "shifted films to a more parochial outlook."l 8 2 Although recent
policy shifts have prompted a revival of co-productions, their character has
changed. Co-productions today tend to be driven by the need to stitch
together multiple state funding sources rather than any underlying artistic or
commercial logic. 18 3 As a result, they no longer deliver the same payoffs in
cross-border distribution and box office drawing power.184
European filmmakers also used to partner with Hollywood's European
subsidiaries, thereby gaining access to U.S. capital, distribution networks,
marketing, and technology. Many of the classic European films in the post-
war decades benefited from U.S. backing.'8 5  The emergence of national
patronage regimes effectively stopped such collaborations by barring
subsidies from flowing to non-European ventures.'8 6 Such blacklisting of
U.S. finance has had perverse consequence." It hurts European
filmmakers far more than Hollywood.' 88 Instead, the main effect of such
prohibitions has been to entrench indigenous oligopolies, hamper
innovation, and further marginalize European cinema.189
F. Summary
European cinema suffers a crisis of confidence. A loss of global
MEDIA for keeping small producers and distributors "alive on life support").
18 DALE, supra note 33, at 167; Jackel, supra note 99, at 24, 26.
182 DALE, supra note 33, at 167
183 European ThinkTank, supra note 70, at 20-21; DALE, supra note 33, at 185.
Unsurprisingly, France has emerged as a co-production hub given its rich array of subsidies
on tap. Jdckel, supra note 99, at 26.
184 Henning & Alpar, supra note 63, at 244.
1ss The notion that foreign capital will taint European culture is bellied a long list of
quintessentially European films made with U.S. backing, from Fellini's La Strada to
Clouzot's La Veritie. See DALE, supra note 33, at 259-81 (giving further examples).
186 DALE, supra note 33, at 184-85, 220. Directors who collaborate with Hollywood face
informal penalties as well. For example, some attribute the exclusion of Amilie from the
Cannes Film Festival, despite the movie's widespread critical acclaim, to French director
Jean-Pierre Jeunet's Hollywood ties.
187 See Jckel, supra note 99, at 27 (contrasting denial of subsidies to A Very Long
Engagement, an adaptation of a French historical novel filmed in France by a French director
using French actors in the French language, because Warner Brothers was a minority
investor, while Oliver Stone's Alexander, a Hollywood production filmed in English,
obtained subsidies based on Stone's French passport from his mother).
188 See DALE, supra note 33, at 220 (criticizing "indulg[ence] in gesture politics").
189 See Buchsbaum, supra note 59, at 17 (describing conflict between large studios who
fear competition from Hollywood vs. independents who would welcome US finance);
Martin, supra note 79, at 8-9 (lack of innovation).
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competitiveness has bred an inward, defensive mindset in which market
failures are rationalized through a patina of cultural superiority propped up
by massive injection of state funding. Far from strengthening European
film, subsidies have given rise to an ossified "national cinema" drained of
creative and commercial dynamism. Failure to export has forced
filmmakers to subsist on a dwindling revenue base even as the budgets of
their Hollywood competitors have soared.19 0
Moreover, the effects of these structural disadvantages are cumulative
over time. Hollywood attracts a critical mass of talent from around the
world precisely because it is a global center of cinematic creativity, finance,
and know-how. Europe may turn out an occasional string of memorable
films, but more often than not, these come from maverick filmmakers
operating outside the patronage system.19' Moreover, over the long haul, its
national filmmakers cannot compete with Hollywood's star power, scale
economies, and global marketing clout.
State patronage consumes enormous resources for which European
taxpayers bear the ultimate cost. It is unclear what value they are getting
for their money. Ultimately, cultural protection is worthless if it means
"protecting" films that no one watches. 192  Yet, European patronage is
engineered to do just that: force-feeding subsidies that create an escalating
stockpile of throwaway productions relegated to the TV graveyard.' 93
Faced with such criticism, European cultural elites tend to respond
with a Gallic shrug. "Culture is not determined by the weekly box office,"
they sniff.194  Hollywood blockbusters succeed because they pander to
vulgar consumer tastes.1 95  One should not "mistake art for
entertainment."'1 96 Such responses are far too glib. Cultural value may not
190 Europe makes more than twice as many movies annually as the United States but
generates only a small fraction of Hollywood's global revenue stream. UNITED NATIONS
EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC, & CULTURAL ORG., INSTITUTE FOR STATISTICS, ANALYSIS OF THE
UIS INTERNATIONAL SURVEY ON FEATURE FILM STATISTICS 4 (2009) [hereinafter UNESCO].
Even with 80% subsidies from the state, European filmmakers must make do with budgets
averaging a tenth of Hollywood's. DALE, supra note 33, at 221-23. See also id. at 118-99
(describing "crushing disparity" between Hollywood and European film).
191 DALE, supra note 33, at 242-44.
192 Harvey B. Feigenbaum, Smart Practice and Innovation in Cultural Policy: Responses
to Americanization 16 (BMW Center for German and European Studies, Working Paper No.
14-05, 2005), available at http://cges.georgetown.edu/files/WorkingPaperFeigenbaum
14-05.pdf.
193 Buchsbaum, supra note 59, at 16; DALE, supra note 33, at 168 (analogizes the
unwatched spools of subsidized celluloid to the infamous wine lakes and food lakes amassed
through European agricultural subsidies).
194 Morrison, supra note 57, at 73.
195 COWEN, supra note 133, at 12; Morrison, supra note 57, at 73 (quoting French
filmmaker as saying, "American culture is nothing more than a consumer product").
1 Morrison, supra note 57, at 72.
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be synonymous with market preferences, but neither are they antitheses.197
Divorcing films from paying audiences is a recipe for cultural irrelevancy.
The commercial failure of European film risks losing the battle for hearts
and minds to Hollywood. Moreover, perpetuating a state monopoly on
audiovisual funding invites distortions of speech content inimical to a free
society.
Such shortcomings might perhaps be ameliorated if European films
truly amounted to cultural gems whose lasting value or influence
transcended box office returns. Yet, the caliber of European film output
hardly justifies such lofty claims to cultural supremacy. As subsidies have
risen, the European films have fallen behind in terms of quantifiable
measures of cultural impact. Awards at prestigious international film
festivals epitomize the cultural currency that European mandarins profess to
recognize. Yet, the share of awards garnered by European films has
declined markedly since patronage became pervasive. In the 1960s and
1970s, France, Italy and the United States all captured roughly the same
total number of awards at the Cannes, Berlin, and Venice Film Festivals
(42, 37, and 45, respectively), and France and Italy surpassed the US if you
exclude actor/actress awards (24: 27: 17). In the 1990s and 2000s, the
United States enjoyed a commanding advantage, garnering almost 50%
more awards than runner-up France (66:47 with actors, or 46:32 without)
and more than triple Italy's prize haul.' 98 In other words, the shift to
culturally selective funding (and higher subsidies) has led to less culturally
significant films measured by Europe's own standards-exactly the
opposite result intended.
Prize Totals from Cannes, Berlin and Venice (Counting Actor/Actresses)
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 TOTAL
USA 18 27 25 35 31 136
FRANCE 29 13 31 26 21 120
ITALY 17 20 15 10 8 70
Total Prizes from Same Three Festivals (Excludine Actor/Actress Awards)
USA 2 15 9 26 20 72
FRANCE 16 81 201 17 15 76
ITALY 15 12 8 8 3 46
Hollywood can succeed in making both blockbusters and art films
197 Scott, supra note 73, at 27.
198 Data compiled from festival websites. Cannes, Berlin, and Venice were chosen
because these are the three oldest and most prestigious festivals in Europe (if not the world)
and thus represent exactly the venues where European patronage should be expected to pay
the greatest dividends.
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because its commercial revenues support a vibrant cinematic ecology whose
concentration of talent, business savvy, and technical capabilities benefit
filmmakers at all levels. In essence, the mass market blockbusters support
the creative infrastructure on which smaller, more culturally ambitious
filmmakers piggyback. 199 If Europe produced more popular hits, it could
afford to make better cultural films as well. 200 Nor are the two mutually
exclusive. Many of Europe's acknowledged cinematic masterpieces were
commercial successes.20 1 In recent years, Europe has placed greater
emphasis on market outcomes as a policy priority, and European film has
shown some signs of recovery. However, the basic structures of state
patronage remain unaltered.202
The failings of European cultural protectionism are unsurprising.
They reflect basic design flaws in the patronage model. Patronage
proponents keep thinking they can reconfigure the apparatus to make it
work: add a tax here, a subsidy there, tweaking criteria and formulae until
the heavens align.203 Such attempts resemble Ptolemaic epicycles-
elaborate efforts to perfect a system built upon a flawed paradigm.204
What is needed is a new model. The pervasiveness of state patronage
as a global model has perpetuated a constricted vision of cultural policy that
has needlessly exacerbated the conflict with world trade law. We need to
expand our conception of cultural protection to work with markets, not
against them. This does not mean pulling the plug and embracing laissez
faire policies that cast European film to the (Hollywood) wolves. It does
mean converting state support from a closed, state-centric regime into a
199 COWEN, supra note 133, at 96.
200 See DALE, supra note 33, at 169, 243.
201 Id. at 169.
202 Indeed, European policy-makers are expanding patronage mechanisms to new
domains such as video game production. See infra note 390.
203 See, e.g., Patrick Messerlin, Regulating Culture: Has it "Gone with the Wind?" 287,
316-17 (June 26-27, 2000) (unpublished manuscript presented at the Productivity
Commission and Australian National University on Achieving Better Regulation of Services,
Canberra), available at http://www.pc.gov.au/ data/assets/pdffile/0020/9191/abros.pdf
(advocating competition between patrons); Meet the French Directors Bemoaning the Gallic
Film Boom, INDEPENDENT, Apr. 18, 2009, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-
entertainment/films/features/meet-the-french-directors-bemoaning-the-gallic-film-boom-
810827.html (discussing proposed tax on popcorn); European ThinkTank, supra note 70, at
15 (proposing audience reeducation).
204 See generally THOMAS KUHN, PARADIGMS IN SCIENTIFIC THOUGHT (1962) (arguing
that science undergoes periodic "paradigm shifts" as existing models strain to account for
observed phenomena precipitating move to alternative explanatory frameworks and
describing shift from Potlemaic to Copernican cosmology as example). Even the French
have begun to have second thoughts about their patronage model. Cultural critic Frederic
Martel provoked widespread debate in France with his 2006 book De La Culture en
Amerique (On Culture in America); the book draws an unfavorable contrast between French
and American cultural policy and echoes earlier critics who have accused French subsidies
of sapping the vitality of French culture. See Schultz, supra note 144, at 111.
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system of decentralized incentives that embrace globalization rather than
resist it.
As it happens, there is a country whose cultural protectionist regime
has made this shift with stunning success: South Korea. By learning from
the Korean example, we can rid ourselves of the Eurocentric bias that
pervades global debate over culture and move toward a more effective
model of protection that minimizes trade conflicts.
III. REINVENTING CULTURAL PROTECTION THROUGH
DECENTRALIZED POLICY
The abysmal track record of state patronage models of cultural
protectionism argues strongly for rethinking the role of the state in cultural
markets. Rather than injecting state funding directly into audiovisual
productions in ways that preempt feedback from paying audiences, the
government should play a supporting role that aims to underwrite the
market through indirect subsidies but not to supplant it. Subsidies should
be decentralized to insulate production decisions from bureaucratic
meddling and red-tape with safeguards against content discrimination.
Distribution should be emphasized over production. Moreover, a concerted
effort should be made to tap into global markets to expand the revenue base
sustaining domestic industries.
South Korea provides the best example of such decentralized, market-
based cultural policies. The Korean experience refutes the notion that trade
liberalization is incompatible with cultural diversity. It suggests almost the
exact opposite that trade can strengthen a culture rather than weaken it.
South Korea's liberalized policies have spawned a dramatic cultural
renaissance in recent decades. Its revitalized audiovisual industries have
achieved record sales both at home and abroad. Their commercial success
has sustained a remarkable flowering of domestic cultural expression.
A. The Korean Wave Rises
The "Korean Wave" refers to the surge of popularity that South
Korean popular culture has enjoyed in recent decades. 0 Korean TV, film
and pop music have all become hot commodities, as well as powerful brand
ambassadors of a hip new Korean national image.206 Korea is one of the
very few countries whose domestic film industry can hold its own against
Hollywood imports. Korean television dramas have won legions of fans
(and prime-time billing) across much of Asia. While numerous factors
contributed to Korea's transformation from cultural backwater to regional
205 See Doobo Shim, Hybridity and the Rise of Korean Popular Culture in Asia 28
MEDIA, CULTURE, & Soc'y 25, 25 (2006).
206 For simplicity, "Korea" and "Korean" will henceforth refer to The Republic of
Korea-popularly known as South Korea.
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superstar, its genesis can be readily traced to changes in government policy.
For much of the 1960s and 1970s, South Korea operated one of the
world's most protected cultural regimes, including a period of outright
censorship under military rule. 207 Strict quotas limited audiovisual imports
and restricted their distribution.2 08 Such regulatory barriers bequeathed an
essentially captive market to domestic producers. At the same time, a
government licensing regime restricted entry and tightly controlled the
subject matter and range of permissible expression. Domestic film
studios made money by churning out low budget productions based on
formulaic Hollywood-style plots, while simultaneously producing more
culturall worthy, moral, and ideologically sound fare to appease state
censors. 1o Either way, pushing product past state censors was more
important than achieving artistic or commercial success. The explicit
linkage of import licenses to domestic production meant that producing
"quota quickies" was merely a means to the more commercially significant
end of acquiring distribution rights to Holl rwood product.2 1 Audience
preferences counted for little in this equation.
Things began to change in the 1980s with the restoration of democratic
rule and a gradual liberalization of social and economic policies. Under
pressure from U.S. trade negotiators, South Korea lifted many of its
213
restrictions on foreign audiovisual content. 2 Opening the door to foreign
competition had the drastic short-term consequences that cultural
protectionists would predict. Korea's audiovisual industries were flattened
by a tidal wave of imported content.2 14  The share of the domestic box
office sales garnered by Korean films plummeted from an average 38%
market share in the early 1980s to less than 16% in 1993.215
207 Prior to 1995, the state did not offer much financial support of its audiovisual
industries. Dal Yong Jin, Cultural Politics in Korea's Contemporary Films under
Neoliberal Globalization, 28 MEDIA CULTURE & Soc'Y 5, 5 (2006).
208 Lee, supra note 114, at 13. Film restrictions included import license quotas, print
quotas, and a ban on foreign distributors. Id. at 13-15.
209 Id. at 13-14.
210 Id. at 13. "Culture" itself was framed largely as a dialogue with the past, which
prioritized folk arts and traditional culture. Jin, supra note 207, at 15.
211 The import license system essentially functioned according to the formula "make one,
get one." Kim, supra note 143, at 202.
212 Lee, supra note 114, at 13.
213 See id., at 15; Jin, supra note 207, at 8.
214 The US market share peaked at 72.3% in 1993. Jin, supra note 207, at 9.
215 Lee, supra note 114, at 15-16. Annual domestic film production halved between
1991 and 1993, dropping from 121 to 63.
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Figure 3: Decline of the South Korean Film Industry, 1983-1993
Alarmed by the collapse of its domestic content industry, Korea's new
democratic rulers embarked on an ambitious cultural policy to revive it.
Crucially, the government recognized that to succeed the industry had to be
placed on a more commercial footing.
1. Market Oriented
In contrast to the previous authoritarian regimes which had viewed
culture as an expression of national identity, Korea's policy-makers
approached culture as a business opportunity.216  An influential 1994
government White Paper offered the example of the Hollywood
blockbuster, Jurassic Park, whose global revenues in box office, TV
syndication, merchandizing, etc. were calculated to be equal to 1.5 million
foreign sales of Hyundai cars. "The comparison of a film to Hyundai
cars-which at that time were considered the 'pride of Korea'-was apt
enough to awaken the Korean public to the idea of culture as an
216 Jin, supra note 207, at 15-16, 19 (describing a shift from focus on cultural identity to
focus on economic potential).
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industry." 217 Film became a commercial enterprise, with artistic merit and
cultural authenticity taking a back seat. Policy-makers saw audiovisuals as
a "strategic sector" to develop primarily through industrial rather than
cultural policy. 218
Korean policy-makers developed a comprehensive strategy to enhance
the competitiveness of its domestic industry. 9 Under the slogan "Learning
from Hollywood," Korea strove to replicate the business structures of U.S.
commercial filmmaking and emulate its production, marketing and
distribution techniques. 220  Studios invested in state-of-the-art
cinematographic equipment. Domestic film distributors adopted
sophisticated business methods to fend off Hollywood rivals.222
Government initiatives, bolstered by legislation passed in 1995 and
1997, deployed a variety of funding to support the restructuring efforts.
Compared to the patronage regimes pioneered in Europe, Korea's total
expenditures remained relatively modest. 223  Moreover, crucially, Korea
eschewed direct involvement in funding specific productions. Instead,
Korean relied on indirect subsidies that operated as a catalyst to private
investment or focused on upgrading technical capabilities.
Korean policy-makers looked initially to the chaebol, South Korea's
giant industrial conglomerates such as Samsung and Daewoo, to jump-start
the domestic audiovisual industry. A combination of informal suasion and
tax incentives induced the chaebol to open film and TV subsidiaries. By
recruiting skilled managers and imposing business discipline backed by
rigorous audience research, the chaebol brought a newly professional
orientation to the industry.224
The chaebol, however, represented only part of Korea's emerging
creative infrastructure. Tax incentives and other regulatory reforms
217 Shim, supra note 205, at 32.
218 Audiovisuals were deemed "cultural software," a necessary complement to the
consumer electronic hardware that Korean manufacturers were rapidly churning out. See
Jin, supra note 207, at 10.
219 Id. at 16; Shim, supra note 205, at 32.
220 Shim, supra note 205, at 32-33 (describing promotion of "vertically integrated media
conglomerates").
221 Jin, supra note 207, at 16 (describing Samsung's use of computer techniques and
helicopter camera-work). See also Lee, supra note 114, at 20-21 (discussing increase in
film production budgets).
222 See Jin, supra note 207, at 18.
223 Lee, supra note 114, at 17. Compare Jin, supra note 207, at 11 (describing a $125
million fund established to promote Korean cinema over five years beginning inl999), with
Lee, supra note 114, at 4 (showing that France and Canada spent triple that amount annually
on their domestic film industry during the same period).
224 Shim, supra note 205, at 33 (describing "an unprecedented entry of fresh talent, such
as MBAs and graduates from prestigious universities, into film companies" and describing
how audience data drove "[e]ach stage in the film-making process" from scriptwriting to
final edits).
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225
encouraged a broader base of private investment in film production.
When the chaebol were forced to contract and abandon their film interests
in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, Korean filmmakers
were thus able to continue to tap venture capital and even raised money
through innovative "netizen funds," whereby investors purchased individual
shares online priced at just a few dollars each to finance a forthcoming
movie production.226 Production budgets rose enabling more ambitious
storytelling and special effects to attract growing audiences.22 7 In essence,
by channeling state subsidies indirectly through private investors in the
form of tax write-offs, Korea avoided the monopsonistic distortions caused
by European patronage, ensuring that production remained responsive to
audiences rather than bureaucratic fiat. Diversifying the audiovisual
industry's financing had the further benefit of supporting a variety of
filmmaking styles.2
Korean policy-makers also invested in upgrades to Korea's creative
infrastructure that benefited the industry as a whole. Korea built cutting-
edge production facilities that were open to all domestic producers.229 It
provided funding to send Korean students to foreign film schools. 23 0 It
recruited foreign experts to consult on new technologies and business
models and sponsored programs to train audiovisual workers in modem
production techniques. More recently, it has invested in digital
technologies and beefed up copyright enforcement to combat piracy of
domestic content.23 1 In short, Korea pursued an industrial policy focused
on enhancing production and distribution capabilities. As with its
decentralized financing, Korea's targeting of capabilities allowed it to
indirectly subsidize audiovisual production without detracting from the
225 Jin, supra note 207, at 11 (describing government reclassification of the movie
business from a service industry to manufacturing, enabling film producers to borrow from
banks for the first time in decades).
226 Jin, supra note 207, at 12. Netizen investors, mostly in their 20s, were often members
of online fan clubs or other movie discussion sites. Id. When investors in these funds scored
a few early hits, such funds became popular, creating a speculative bubble during the
"DotCom" era. Id. at 12-13.
227 Lee, supra note 114, at 20-21 (describing average film productions costs rising from
less than $1 million in 1996 to $3.5 million by 2003). Average audience size rose almost
six-fold in the same period. Id. at 22-23.
228 Dal Yong Jin, Reinterpretation of Cultural Imperialism: Emerging Domestic Market
Versus Continuing U.S. Dominance 29 MEDIA CULTURE & Soc'Y 753, 758 (2007).
229 Sanghyun Yoon & Harvey B. Feigenbaum, Global Strategies for National Culture:
Korean Media Policy in International Perspective, 3 SEOUL J. Bus. 127, 138 (1997).
230 See Patrick Frater, Korean Film Council Looks Abroad, VARIETY, Feb. 8, 2008,
available at http://www.variety.com/article/VR1 117980541?refcatid=2894.
231 Korea's Digital Wave Travels Far, FDI MAG., Oct. 3, 2005, available at
http://www.fdiintelligence.com/Archive/Korea-s-digital-wave-travels-far (describing Korea's
"creation of a digital media cluster"); Woongjae Ryoo, Globalization, or the Logic of
Cultural Hybridization: The Case of the Korean Wave, 19 ASIAN J. COMM. 137, 142 (2009)
(discussing Korean controls against copying and piracy).
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primacy of audiences as the ultimate consumer.
2. Distribution-Focused
In addition to decentralized finance and infrastructural investments,
Korea initiated a third major policy intervention in the 1990s: a resuscitated
screen quota. Screen quotas require movie theaters to reserve a minimum
quantum of exhibition time for national films to be screened to domestic
audiences.2 3 2  Against the overall trend of Korea's audiovisual
liberalization, Korea's screen quota stands out as the one significant trade
barrier that Korea kept.233
Korea's decision in 1993 to begin actively enforcing its screen quota
marked the beginning of a striking reversal of its film industry's decline.234
From their nadir of a 15.9% domestic market share that year, Korean-made
films rebounded to claim over 50% within a decade.235
U Korean Films [ Foreisn Films
CD
aT
INS 14 Ms $n MW on ZO UOM 2M s ZOO U ZWO ZMO SOS
Admittedly, correlation is not causation. Commentators disagree as to
232 During this period, the mandatory screening requirement was 146 days per year,
although a slight reduction was possible if theaters screened Korean films during the high-
demand season. Lee, supra note 114, at 16. This meant reserving about 30% of screen time
for Korean films, leaving 70% for market-based selections. Kim, supra note 143, at 234.
233 Korea also belatedly introduced a domestic content quota for television programming
in 2000, analogous to its screen quota for film. Lee, supra note 114, at 17. As discussed
below, however, there is reason to doubt the need for or effectiveness of such TV quotas.
234 Lee, supra note 114, at 16, 18-19.
235 Id. at 16, 19; KOREAN FILM COUNCIL, KOREAN CINEMA 2008 462 (Yang You-jeong
ed., 2008), available at http://www.koreanfilm.or.kr/KOFIC/Channel?task-kofic.user.eng.
d_publication.command.PublicationRetrievel Cmd&GesipanSCD=000000000000000001.
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the extent to which Korea's screen quota was instrumental in the industry's
recovery. 2 36 Some argue that other factors such as increased film budgets
or expanding domestic cinema capacity played a larger role.237 Skeptics
also argue that whatever early benefits the screen quota conferred have been
rendered superfluous now that the Korean film industry regularly exceeds
the quota through market performance.2 38
Without attempting to resolve this causal debate, it is worth observing
that a screen quota does promise several theoretical benefits. By
guaranteeing domestic producers access to the local market, the quota
reduces the risks entailed in filmmaking and encourages private
investment. 2 39 In this respect, the higher budgets cited by quota skeptics as
an alternative explanation for Korea's success do not constitute an
independent variable. Studio financiers were likely more willing to fund
high budget productions given greater assurance that their films would be
exhibited. Screen quotas can also improve export prospects by ensuring
opportunities for domestic films to "prove themselves" in their home
market, thus making them more of a known quantity for foreign
distributors.2 40
In recent years, the domestic market share of Korean movies has easily
exceeded the quota floor. Even so, the screen quota arguably retains more
than symbolic value. As noted, filmmaking is a risky business, hostage to
the uncertain alchemy of creative talent and capricious audience tastes.
Anything that reduces such uncertainty encourages investment.2 4 1  If
nothing else, the clamor of concern provoked by the recent reduction of the
242
screen quota underscores its salience as a psychological safety net.
236 Compare Lee, supra note 114, at 28, with Yongjae Choi, Does Screen Quota Really
Promote Local Film Production?, 3 KOREA AsSOC'N FOR TELECOMM. POLICIES 119 (2007),
available at http://www.katp.or.kr/down/15200554.pdf [hereinafter Choi, Screen Quota].
See also Byung-il Choi, Culture and Trade in the APEC: Case of Film Industry in Canada,
Mexico and Korea, 2002 KOREA INST. INT'L ECON. POL'Y 39-40 (2002) [hereinafter Choi,
Culture and Trade in the APEC] (discussing various factors other than the screen quota that
influenced the performance of Korean movies); MARK RUSSELL, POP GOES KOREA: BEHIND
THE REVOLUTION IN MOVIES, MUSIC, AND INTERNET CULTURE 68-69 (2008).
237 Shi Young Lee, Eun-mee Kim & Young 11 Kim, The Effect of the Korean Screen
Quota System on Box Office Performance, 42 J. WORLD TRADE 335, 343 (2008); Choi,
Culture and Trade in the APEC, supra note 236, at 39-40.
238 Lee, Kim, & Kim, supra note 237, at 341-43.
239 As a creative industry, film production is a high-risk business. By assuring domestic
producers a reasonable chance to have their films distributed, the quota eliminates some of
that uncertainty, making it easier to attract investment and financing. Lee, supra note 114, at
19-20.
240 Id. at 28 (noting "box-office success in domestic markets is generally used as the best
indicator of the film's potential success in other countries").
241 Commentators also argue the quota serves as a check on anticompetitive practices by
Hollywood distributors such as block-booking that could otherwise be difficult to deter.
Kim, supra note 143, at 231; Lee, supra note 114, at 7.
242 Jin, supra note 207, at 19.
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Accordingly, there is a plausible case that the screen quota has played a
non-trivial role in underpinning Korea's success.
Korea's reliance on the screen quota presents a sharp contrast with the
production subsidies favored by European patronage. As we saw, the latter
results in production of movies that elite paymasters favor while doing
nothing to ensure that audiences actually watch them (and discouraging
producers from even getting them distributed). By contrast, screen quotas
operate explicitly at the distribution level. Rather than funding the creation
of cultural artifacts for their own sake, such quotas only have value to the
extent realized through market returns. By preserving the link to paying
audiences and encouraging distribution, Korea's screen quota thus offers
clear advantages over European patronage.
Korea's screen quota also has clear advantages as a cultural
protectionist instrument over the domestic content quotas for television
relied on in Europe. South Korea is unusual in employing a screen quota as
its weapon of choice. Widely used in the early postwar decades, screen
quotas have gone out of fashion. In Europe, most countries have either
repealed or ceased to actively enforce them. By contrast, quotas on
television content are much more pervasive, perhaps reflecting the quasi-
public nature of broadcasters, which reduces the political costs of imposing
such requirements.24 3
While both types of quotas promote distribution of domestic
audiovisuals, screen quotas focus on film exhibition, which represents the
more prestigious, high-value sector of the industry. Successful movie
launches generate substantial follow-on revenues from DVD sales to
improved export prospects. Accordingly, to the extent screen quotas induce
greater investment and innovation in domestic filmmaking, a great deal of
value can potentially be captured downstream. By contrast, as we saw,
television quotas foster lower quality productions that do not offer nearly
the same payoffs and risk-diverting film production from the higher-value
theatrical distribution. Moreover, television quotas are being rendered
obsolete by new digital "on demand" delivery platforms. 244 Accordingly,
Korea's emphasis on screen quotas for film confers significant strategic
advantages over television quotas.
The main drawback with screen quotas concerns uncertainty as to the
optimal level at which to fix the quota.245 Set too low, the quota becomes
243 Governments broadcast monopolies are contingent upon certain public trust functions.
By contrast, privately owned cinemas are liable to protest screen quota mandates as
interfering with their livelihood, property, or freedom of speech. Cf Kim, supra note 143, at
204-05.
244 See supra note 115-19 and accompanying text.
245 See Lee, supra note 114, at 31 (emphasizing the significance of setting quotas at the
right rate). Poorly calibrated quotas have led to a variety of unintended consequences
including a proliferation of pornographic films in Brazil. See Randal Johnson, Film Policy
in Latin America, in FILM POLICY: INTERNATIONAL, NATIONAL AND REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES
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meaningless. Set too high, it insulates domestic producers from foreign
competition to the detriment of production quality. 2 46 Overly aggressive
quotas also hurt exhibition revenues, discouraging investment in domestic
cinemas.247 Ideally, the quota should serve as a pacesetter to encourage
investment but not get too far ahead of industry capacity or market
demand.24 8 Because filmmaking is such an uncertain business hostage to
vagaries of supply and demand, fine-tuning the quota level can therefore
present a challenge, particularly where the quota is tied to production in
only one country. Part IV proposes a novel global diversity that
substantially alleviates such uncertainty.249
3. Decentralized
Both Korea's screen quota and tax incentives function in a
decentralized manner to stimulate domestic investment with minimal
government. Unlike direct subsidies, which require cumbersome
bureaucracies to administer, compliance is largely self-enforced with
minimal red-tape. The tax incentives can be claimed on individual returns.
Likewise, responsibility for implementing the screen quota initially falls
upon private cinemas. A civic-watch group conducts external monitoring
backed by government penalties.25 0
Korea's infrastructural investments have been more "hands on" in
terms of bureaucratic involvement. In this respect, they are subject to the
usual hazards of industrial policy.2 5 1 However, South Korea's government
has mitigated some of these concerns by self-consciously casting itself in a
supporting role focused on enhancing industry-wide capabilities. Korea
eschewed direct subsidies to commercial productions and focused instead
on investments that benefited the industry as a whole. As we saw, Korean
policy-makers resisted the temptation to elevate the chaebol into "cultural
champions." Instead, Korea's decentralized policies serve to diversify its
creative base and nurture new talent.2 52 Such creative diversification offset
133 (Albert Moran ed., 1996).
246 See Carolyn Hyun-Kyung Kim, Building the Korean Film Industry's Competitiveness:
Abolish the Screen Quota and Subsidize the Film Industry, 9 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 353,
374 (2000).
247 Lack of cinema capacity means less domestic screening opportunities, while badly
run-down venues can depress audience demand, both of which disproportionately harm
domestic productions.
248 Cf Lee, supra note 114, at 7 (recommending 30% quota based on empirical study).
249 See infra notes 400-13 and accompanying text.
250 Lee, supra note 114, at 18; Screen Quota and Korean Film Industry, COALITION FOR
CULTURAL DIVERSITY MOVING IMAGES (July 16, 2003), available at http://www.
screenquota.com/v2/eng/board/read.asp?board=engresearch&category-itle&keyword=&p
age=2&id=7060.
251 Kim, supra note 246, at 360.
252 See KOREAN FILM COUNCIL, The Growth and Outlook of the Korean Cinema: 1996 -
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Korea's initial emphasis on vertical integration and helped to ensure the
Korean Wave's long-term viability. 253
4. Non-discriminatory
The firewall protecting Korea's audiovisual policies from content-
discrimination was both a deliberate policy decision and also a structural
consequence of the commercially oriented and decentralized policies
described above. Unlike European patrons who enforced elite conceptions
of cultural value, Korean policy-makers insisted that the market remain the
ultimate arbiter. Focusing on production capabilities and business models
provided a value-neutral way for the government to offer support without
being tempted to influence content. Laundering subsidies through private
investors similarly insulated against state bias. Likewise, Korea's (cinema)
screen and television quotas applied to all domestically-produced content
rather than singling out particular works deemed of cultural value. The
automatic and rigid nature of such quotas limits the scope for bureaucratic
micromanagement and authoritarian abuse. Korea's reliance on
decentralized and indirect mechanisms thus avoids the market and speech
distortions created by European state patronage.
5. Globalized
From the start, Korean policy-makers set their sights on realizing the
export potential of the audiovisual industry.254 They recognized the critical
importance of economies of scale to sustain production quality and compete
with Hollywood. 255 Encouraging vertically integrated media conglomerates
led by the chaebol and network broadcasters gave Korean industry the heft
and connections necessary to sustain export capabilities. 256 Co-production
agreements with neighboring states opened new distribution channels. 257
Meanwhile, the independent sourcing requirement ensured a diversity of
Present, in KOREAN CINEMA: FROM ORIGINS TO RENAISSANCE (Kim Mee-hyun, ed., 2007)
(describing subsidization of independent, short films as means to nurture promising directors
who move on to bigger things).
253 Jin, supra note 228, at 758-59.
254 See Jin, supra note 207, at 9-10.
255 Lee, supra note 114, at 28. Market clout also helped negotiate collaborative relations
with Hollywood. Doobo Shim, The Glocalization of the Korean Media 22 (May 27, 2004)
(unpublished manuscript presented at the Int'l Comm. Ass'n Annual Meeting, New Orleans),
available at http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla-apa research-citationl/1/3/0/7/
pagesl13073/pl13073-1.php. at 10.
256 See Jin, supra note 228, at 758-59; Jin, supra note 207, at 10.
257 See Jin, supra note 228, at 759. In addition to regional tie-ups, Korean filmmakers
have entered into several production and distribution deals with media companies in Europe
and Hollywood, including DreamWorks, MCA, and Canal Plus. See Jin, supra note 207, at
14.
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product offerings to compete for foreign distribution rights. 25 8 Korea's
relatively low-priced, high quality productions soon won them fans across
the region and even in countries as geographically and culturally remote as
Iran and Mexico. 25 9 The success of Korean television dramas paved the
way for film and music exports, as shared emblems of Korea's emerging
identity as a pop culture dynamo.
Korean policy-makers also took specific measures to promote exports.
They sponsored film festivals to showcase Korean talent and to expose
Korean filmmakers to the best of global cinema. 2 60  Korea's culture
ministry actively coordinated joint publicity and marketing campaigns with
its popular culture industries.2 ' Korean officials helped to open the door to
co-production agreements with neighboring states.262  Government
provided export insurance to lubricate overseas deals.263 Korean officials
264
also lobbied trade partners to respect copyrights on Korean content.
In sum, Korea's support of its audiovisual industries comprised a
proactive set of government policies that diverged sharply from the
European pattern of protectionism. Korea's emphasis on commercial rather
than culture values ensured that filmmakers responded to audience demand
rather than government fiat. Eschewing direct patronage, Korean policy-
makers relied primarily on decentralized, non-discriminatory policies. And
embracing globalization, Korean policy-makers actively pursued export
markets that would allow its domestic producers to reap the economies of
scale essential to long-term competitiveness.
6. Assessment
The results have been nothing less than spectacular. Korean movie
blockbusters have consistently topped domestic box office charts since
1999.265 Korean films have been shown worldwide, winning both audience
and critical acclaim. Export revenues skyrocketed from $400,000 to $76
million from 1996 to 2005.266 Major U.S. companies such as Fox and
Columbia have signed deals for global distribution rights, and others have
purchased screenplay rights for U.S. remakes.267
258 Jin, supra note 228, at 758-59.
259 See Lee, supra note 114, at 30.
260 See Shim, supra note 205, at 34. Unlike Europe, however, Korean policy-makers
never viewed festival exhibition as a substitute for mainstream cinema.
261 Shim, supra note 255, at 22. The Korean Wave has also figured in cross-marketing
promotions. Id. at 7.
262 Id at 23.
263 Id.
264
265 Lee, supra note 114, at 21.
266 KOREAN FILM COUNCIL, supra note 252, at 360.
267 Shim, supra note 205, at 29.
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Meanwhile, Korean dramas have captivated audiences across Asia. 268
TV exports increased more than twelvefold from 1995 to 2004, jumping
from $5.5 to $71.4 million.2 69 Success breeds success: Greater revenue has
meant greater resources to reinvest in ambitious productions and expanded
distribution. 270  Korean movie stars are now amongst the highest-paid
outside of Hollywood.27 1 What is more, the Korean Wave has had staying
power. Although the market share of domestic films has nudged downward
slightly in the last couple of years, South Korea's audiovisual juggernaut
continues to steamroll regional competitors and hold its own against
Hollywood.
Korean pop culture has become the hip new presence across much of
East and Southeast Asia, influencing such lifestyle choices as food, fashion,
and even plastic surgery.272 The regional "infatuation with Korean culture"
273has inspired fans to study Korean, travel to Korea, and date Korean men.
It has also bestowed a halo effect on Korean export industries (many of
whom have hired Korean movie stars as their pitchmen).274  Finally, the
positive image garnered by Korea's cultural exports has also had
geopolitical ramifications, salving diplomatic strains and burnishing
Korea's national identity and regional image. 275 In short, South Korea-a
country not previously noted for its cultural vitality-has rapidly emerged
as a cultural and commercial heavyweight in global production of popular
culture.
268 Id. at 29-30. Hu Jintao, the president of China, is, by his own report, a huge fan of
the Korean historical TV epic miniseries, "Jewel in the Palace." Clifford Coonan, Hu
Jinato: The Hard Man, INDEPENDENT, Feb. 16, 2008, available at http://www.independent.
co.uk/news/people/profiles/hu-jintao-the-hard-man-783065.html.
269 Jin, supra note 228, at 753.
270 Woongjae Ryoo, Globalization, or the Logic of Cultural Hybridization: The Case of
the Korean Wave, 19 ASIAN J. COMM. 137, 140 (2009). Film and TV budgets have risen
almost tenfold, leading to more innovative, higher quality productions. Lee, supra note 114,
at 27-28.
271 Anthony Faiola, Japanese Women Catch the 'Korean Wave' Male Celebrities Just
Latest Twist in Asia-Wide Crazy, WASH. POST, Aug. 31, 2006, available at http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/30/AR2006083002985.html.
272 Shim, supra note 205, at 29 ("In the streets of Hanoi and Beijing, it is common to find
young members of the 'Korea Tribe,' or Koreanophiles, sporting multiple earrings, baggy
hip-hop pants, and the square-toed shoes of Seoul fashion.").
273 See Shim, supra note 205, at 29-30 (language study); id at 30 (film tours); What Is It
About Korean Men that Japanese Women Adore?, CHOSUN ILBO, July 29, 2004, available at
http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200407/200407290028.html (describing the
desirability of dating Korean men due to the Korean Wave).
274 Shim, supra note 261, at 6; Faiola, supra note 271.
275 See Shim, supra note 261, at 5, 14 (describing "soft power" accrued in the wake of
Korean Wave); Ryoo, supra note 270, at 145 (describing vision of democratic society
projected).
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B. Three Questions from Skeptics
Impressive though these results may be, some hard questions must be
answered if we are to accept the Korean Wave as a model for reinventing
cultural protectionism:
(1) Does commercial success correlate with cultural value? Has the
Korean Wave produced content that serves the goals of cultural
protectionism?
(2) How much did government policy matter? Was there really a
market failure that required state intervention, or would the Korean
audiovisual industry have reached the same outcome on its own?
(3) Does Korea offer an exportable model, or did the Korean Wave
depend upon unique circumstances unlikely to be replicated?
We address these three "skeptic's questions" in turn.
1. Cultural Value
As to first skeptic's question, "cultural value" is inevitably subjective
and can be measured in many ways. However, from the standpoint of the
proclaimed goals of cultural protectionism-identity building, democratic
discourse, and human heritage-the Korean Wave scores well. By
producing compelling stories that command audience attention and advance
public discourse, Korea has clearly passed the threshold test of a
dialogically-based rationale for cultural protection. 2 76 Korea is one of the
few countries in the world where domestic films hold their own against
Hollywood competition, and Korea's successful exporting of its pop culture
products has contributed to a newly hip identity for the erstwhile Hermit
Kingdom.277
But has the Korea Wave's popularity been purchased at the expense of
cultural distinctiveness? To the extent its commercial appeal rests solely on
repackaged Hollywood formulas, we might conclude that rather than
besting the cultural imperialists, Korea has merely joined their ranks.
Simply put: is there anything Korean about the Korean Wave?
Clearly, there is. By all accounts, the thematic content of Korea Wave
productions are much more authentically Korean and contemporary than the
formulaic "quota quickies" that preceded them.2 7 8  Rather than simply
pander to "universal" consumer tastes, Korean films and TV shows have
276 See supra notes 36-37 & 40-42 and accompanying text.
277 Ryoo, supra note 270, at 145. See also Asia Goes Crazy Over Korean Pop Culture,
CHOSUN ILBO, 2006, available at http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html-dir/2006/01/07/
2006010761003.html.
278 Ryoo, supra note 270, at 142 (describing "new script templates that center more fully
on distinctively South Korean situations .. . less formulaic Hollywood clichis" and "less
predictable, even unique, storylines").
109
HeinOnline  -- 31 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 109 2011
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 31:63 (2011)
taken advantage of the new era of democratic freedom to delve into
sensitive topics that had previously been off-limits. 2 79
Korean history has proved a rich mine for excavation. Best-selling
films have depicted life during Korea's medieval dynasties,280 reenacted the
Korean War, ' and explored more recent historical events.282 Perhaps
unsurprisingly, relations with North Korea and themes of conflict and
reunification underlie many popular movies. 28 Recent movie hits have
tackled other politically sensitive topics linked to contemporary events. For
example, Korea's all-time box office champion, THE HOST, is a monster
horror story with a political twist-the mutant amphibian in the film is
spawned by the dumping of toxic waste by the U.S. military in Korea-
based on an actual incident.2 84 Reenactments of real-life crime stories have
279 Shim, supra note 205, at 33.
280 Notable among these are THE KING AND THE CLOWN (2005), a release about a courtly
romance that currently reigns as the #2 all-time bestseller, as well as THE DIVINE WEAPON
(2008) (ranking #40), UNTOLD SCANDAL (2003) (#42). WIKIPEDIA, Cinema of Korea: All-
time Box Office Records, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cinemaof Korea#All-time box
office records (last updated Sept. 28, 2010) [hereinafter Korean All-Time Box Office].
281 Notable Korean War films include TAEGUKGI: THE BROTHERHOOD OF WAR (2004),
praised for its "unflinching portrayal of. . . the brutality of both the North and South Korean
armies," and WELCOME TO DONGMAKGOL (2005), which portrays soldiers from both North
and South who stumble upon a secluded village whose residents are unaware of the outside
world. WIKIPEDIA, Taegukgi, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taegukgi (film) (last updated
Dec. 2, 2010); WIKlPEDIA, Welcome to Dongmakgol, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Welcome to Dongmakgol (last updated Nov. 17, 2010). They are, respectively, the #3 and
#10 all-time best-selling films in Korea. Korean All-Time Box Office, supra note 280. See
also RUSSEL, supra note 235, at 59-64.
282 For example, SILMIDO (2003) and MAY 18 (2007) provide fictionalized accounts of
popular uprisings during South Korea's military dictatorship, and FOREVER THE MOMENT
(2008) celebrates the 2004 Olympic silver medal won by the Korean women's handball
team. RUSSEL, supra note 235, at 59-64. They rank, respectively, #5, #11 and #35 on the all-
time bestseller list. Id.
283 SILMIDO (2005) describes a fictional plot to assassinate North Korean dictator Kim 11-
sung as well as efforts to negotiate peaceful reunification. Derek Elley, Silmido, VARIETY,
Feb. 2, 2004, at 76. Two other landmark films also dealt with North-South relations: SHIRI
(1999) depicts an elite North Korean hit squad sent into the South. The title refers to a
Korean fish, and a key monologue "describes how the waters from both North and South
Korea flow freely together, and how the fish can be found in either water without knowing
which it belongs to." WIKIPEDIA, Shiri (Film), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shiri_(film) (last
visited Dec. 25, 2010). JOINT SECURITY AREA (2000) revolves around "a fatal shooting
incident within the DMZ, the heavily fortified border that separates North and South Korea."
WIKIPEDIA, Joint Security Area, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joint Security Area (film)
(last visited on Dec. 25, 2010). They rank #15 and #18, respectively. Korean All-Time Box
Office, supra note 280.
284 WIKiPEDIA, The Host, http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilTheHost_(film) (last visited Oct.
15, 2010). The chemical agent used by the American military to combat the monster in the
film is also named "Agent Yellow" in a thinly-veiled reference to Agent Orange, a chemical
sprayed by the US military in Vietnam with devastating environmental consequences. Id.
Further targets of satire woven throughout the film include inept, uncaring government
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also been a recurring feature.28 5 Other films have dealt with modem social
issues set in a distinctively Korean milieu. 2 86
Such recognizably Korean stories about lived Korean experiences help
to remake Korean identity and adapt its traditions to the modem age.
Portrayal of changing gender relationships has also challenged social
conventions. 287 Similarly, rehashing history has prompted new debate over
current geopolitical issues. 2 8 8  By provoking popular discourse on such
issues of contemporary relevance, Korean audiovisuals invite audiences to
clarify their belief systems and values, thereby informing policy decisions
and contributing to democratic governance.289
This is not to deny that the "Korean Wave" has its frivolous side.
Many of the films and TV shows conform to conventional genres of
popular culture from romantic comedies to gangster tales to sitcoms and
dramas. Gratuitous violence, sexual innuendo, and humor all make their
appearance. Particularly in the early years of chaebol-dominated
filmmaking, critics lamented the "Blockbuster-ization of Korean movies
and cultural identity," dismissing the big budget action films then in vogue
officials and self-righteous protesters. Id.
285 Notable films in this genre include MEMORIES OF MURDER (2003), ranked #22 on the
all-time bestseller list and VOICE OF A MURDERER (2007). Korean All-Time Box Office,
supra note 280.
286 FRIEND (2001), a record-breaking film now ranked #8, provides a fictionalized version
of the director's coming of age in his hometown. WIKIPEDIA, Friend, http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Friend (2001 film) (last visited Oct. 15, 2010). An earlier breakthrough movie,
SOPYONJE (1993), portrays "traditional Korean pansori singers trying to make a living in the
modern world." WIKIPEDIA, Seopyeonje, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sopyonje (last visited
Oct. 15, 2010). MARATHON (2005) chronicles the true story of an autistic runner whose
passion is encouraged by his devoted mother. WIKIPEDIA, Marathon (2005 Film),
http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilMarathon_(2005 film) (last visited Dec. 25, 2010). THE WAY
HOME (2002) captures the intergenerational tension between a rural grandmother and her
city-born grandson. WIKIPEDIA, The Way Home, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TheWay
Home (last visited Dec. 25, 2010). They rank #24 and #32. Korean All-Time Film Box
Office, supra note 280.
287 This phenomenon was particularly notable with respect to the prime-time Korean soap
opera, "Winter Sonata," which explored the generational conflicts of young Korean lovers
struggling to reconcile their yuppie lifestyles with familial expectations and Confucian
tradition. RUSSELL, supra note 236, at 118-19.
288 Id. at 120 (describing nationalistic tensions with Japan).
289 In some cases, the influence of Korean films has had measurable effects. The
publicity given to the unresolved murder portrayed in the film MEMORIES OF MURDER led to
proposals to amend Korea's statute of limitations to give prosecutors more time to solve the
case. WIKIPEDIA, Memories of Murder, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memories of Murder
(last visited Oct. 15, 2010); Frank Scheck, Memories of Murder, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER,
July 21, 2005. The Pansori singers portrayed in SOPYONJE renewed public interest in what
had been a dying art form. WIKIPEDIA, Seopyeonje, supra note 282. MARATHON brought
new awareness in Korea to autism as a disability. WIKIPEDIA, Marathon, http://en.wikipedia.
org/wikilMarathon_%282005_film%29 (last visited Oct. 15, 2010).
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as merely "another version of Hollywood." 29 0 But to focus only on such
standard elements of popular storytelling is to miss the cultural content
embedded within. 291  Nor should the hype surrounding Korea's biggest
blockbusters distract attention from the diversity of audiovisuals being
produced.292
By developing its creative infrastructure within a highly competitive
commercial industry, Korea has gained the capacity to innovate at all levels
of audiovisual production .29  The best Korean movies more than hold their
own on the international "high culture" stage, capturing prizes at Cannes
and other prestigious venues. 29 4  As such, they contribute to the cultural
heritage of humanity. More importantly, the distinctive perspective offered
by Korean movies and TV shows are actually touching the lives of
audiences who watch them around the world.
Nor has Korea's emphasis on cultural exports compromised the
"Koreanness" of the Korean Wave. On the contrary, by all accounts, the
recognizably cultural themes of the Korean Wave have been a big part of
their success.295 East Asian audiences, in particular, want to watch movies
and shows about people who look like them and face similar issues in
290 Jin, supra note 207, at 17; Shim, supra note 205, at 40 (describing blockbusters as
causing "concern over a narrowing of diversity"). Jin notes the withdrawal of the chaebol
and proliferation of mid-sized film companies funded by venture capitalists has produced
more culturally authentic fare in recent years. Jin, supra note 207, at 18.
291 A great example of this is the THE HOST, whose surface narrative about a man-eating
amphibian provides the foil for layers of commentary about environmental protection, US-
Korean relations, and generational politics. WIKIPEDIA, The Host, supra note 280. See also
Ryoo, supra note 270, at 145 (describing how Korean Wave adapts Confucian values to
contemporary, modern lifestyles).
292 Lee, supra note 114, at 24 (describing diversity within Korean film). In an earlier
conference version of his article, Ryoo, supra note 270, makes a similar point. See
Woongjae Ryoo, Globalization, or the Logic of Cultural Hybridization: The Case of the
Korean Wave, 9 (May 23, 2007) (unpublished manuscript presented at the Int'l Comm.
Ass'n Annual Meeting, San Francisco), available at http://www.allacademic.com//meta
p mlaaparesearch citation/l/6/8/7/9/pages168799/pl68799-1.php (describing Korean
filmmaking as a "full-service cinema").
293 Ryoo, supra note 270, at 142.
294 Lee, supra note 114, at 23; Jin, supra note 207, at 18. OLD Boy won the Grand Prix
at the 2004 Cannes Film Festival. Even THE HosT, Korea's #1 all-time champion, received
critical acclaim, appearing on several lists of 10 best films of 2007 compiled by film critics
in Japan, France, and the US. Korea's overall haul of festival prizes since 2000 compares
favorably with many of the state patronage regimes in Europe.
295 See Jin, supra note 228, at 760; Shim, supra note 205, at 39; Ryoo, supra note 270, at
145. The main exception seems to have been television co-productions with East Asian
partners where political sensitivities prompted a deliberate effacement of geographic and
cultural specificity. See Dal Yong Jin & Dong-hoo Lee, The Birth of East Asia: Cultural
Regionalization through Co-Production Strategies (unpublished manuscript presented at the
annual meeting of the International Communication Association, May 23, 2007, San
Francisco, CA), available at http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p mla aparesearch_
citation/1/7/1/0/5/pages 171052/pl 71052-1 .php.
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life.296 The Confucian values and historical settings of Korean productions
are often a big selling point and a source of regional comparative advantage
over competing Hollywood products.2 97 The Korean experience, therefore,
calls into question the claim that exporting audiovisual products requires
29
sacrificing cultural distinctiveness.298 Overall, Korea's audiovisual industry
seems to have thrived because of its cultural content, not in spite of it.
2. Government as Catalyst
What about the second skeptic's question-was government
dispensable? It is certainly true that much of Korea's success depended
upon private initiative and favorable market timing.299 An element of luck
undoubtedly factored in as well.300 Yet the sharp reversal in outcomes from
the collapse of Korea's domestic audiovisual industry under the laissez faire
policies of the 1980s and its dramatic revival in the mid-1990s once Korea
reactivated its screen quota and implemented subsidy schemes is
suggestive-to say the least--of a significant government role. 30 1 Korea's
example highlights the potential for proactive government policy to
catalyze investment and encourage market entry by private actors. Perhaps
Korea's audiovisual industries would have recovered eventually on their
own and gone on to equally dazzling successes without government aid.
But not necessarily. Mexico liberalized its film market and abolished its
screen quota post-NAFTA, and a once-flourishing industry was virtually
wiped out. It has yet to recover fully. 30 2
3. Exportability Beyond Korea
As for the third skeptic's question whether Korea's success is
generalizable, skeptics will point to explanatory factors specific to Korea's
situation. Some contend that Koreans are the "Italians of Asia," a people by
nature spontaneous and emotive, whose rugged good looks and creative
296 Shim, supra note 205, at 39.
297 Ryoo, supra note 270, at 145.
298 Cf Baker, supra note 1, at 1413.
299 See infra notes 304-07 and accompanying text.
300 One might, for example, point to the arrival of a particularly talented generation of
filmmakers. Cf Shim, supra note 205, at 33. One could ascribe the Korean Wave's appeal
to the vagaries of fashion, or explain it as an inevitable byproduct of globalization. Cf
RUSSELL, supra note 236, at 210-15.
301 Isolating and weighing the relative significance of the complex causal forces at play
presents a daunting empirical challenge. However, both common sense and contemporary
understanding point to the crucial role played by Korea's government in boosting confidence
and concentrating minds to achieve the turnaround.
302 Annual film production plummeted from 100 to less than ten. Choi, Culture and
Trade in the APEC, supra note 236, at 33-34. Only re-imposition of the screen quota a
decade later brought it back from the dead. Id. at 34.
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flair make them natural crowd-pleasers.30 3 The Korean Wave also
benefited from favorable timing on many fronts, including market
conditions (growing demand for audiovisual products), 304 macro-economic
forces (e.g., a well-timed currency devaluation), 30' and social trends (pent-
up demand for cultural expression and popular entertainment). 306  It is
tempting to dismiss the Korean Wave as fluke-and perhaps only
307temporary.
However, there is every reason to think that other countries could also
benefit from studying Korea's playbook. First, Korea was hardly a natural
candidate to excel. Its success contravenes the received wisdom that only
big countries with large markets can thrive in global competition.30 s South
Korea has only 49 million people, and Korean is neither widely spoken
outside Korea nor is there a large Korean diaspora community.309 Other top
film producing nations have either much larger populations or economies,
or both.310
Second, many of the favorable conditions that benefited Korea either
are present elsewhere or else could be replicated through appropriate policy
changes. The emergence of a newly affluent consumer class with
disposable income to spend on entertainment represents a global
303 Korean male leads' portrayal of "macho tough guys with sensitive souls" have, by
some accounts, redefined standards of masculinity in East Asia. See supra note 272.
3 The Korean Wave arrived during an era of media liberalization across Asia. Newly
launched or privatized TV stations (broadcast, cable, satellite) created a sudden demand for
content that Korea's audiovisual exports filled. See Jin, supra note 228, at 761. At home,
rising level of cinema attendance reflected the new-found prosperity of Korean audiences
who, having sacrificed leisure activities during Korea's drive to industrialize, were now
eager to indulge in cultural pursuits.
305 The Asian financial crisis accentuated the cost advantage of Korean products vis-a-vis
competing Hollywood offerings. Id. at 757. In addition, Korean filmmakers benefited from
a speculative bubble during the dotcom era, during which venture capital and "netizen"
investor finds poured into the audiovisual industry with irrational exuberance. Has Spring
Come for Korean Films?, KOR. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2001, available at 2001 WLNR 6267759.
306 Korea's return to democracy in the late 1980s encouraged filmmakers to explore
previously forbidden topics. Domestic audiences responded eagerly, as artistic expression
dovetailed with the cultural yearnings described above. See supra note 300.
307 Skeptics note that Korea's domestic market share has dipped slightly in recent years
and that its dominance is being challenged by regional upstarts from Thailand to China.
RUSSELL, supra note 236, at 68-69.
30s Cf WILDMAN & SIWEK, supra note 28, at 75.
309 About seven million people overseas claim Korean ancestry. WIKIPEDIA, Korean
Diaspora, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean diaspora (last visited Oct. 15, 2010).
310 In 2006, the top ten producers by output were India, USA, Japan, China, France,
Germany, Spain, Italy, South Korea, and the UK. South Korea has a smaller population and
economy than all of them. Except for India and China, they are also wealthier per capita.
UNESCO, supra note 190, at 7-10. The UNESCO data excludes Nigeria's prodigious video
film production, which would rank #2 on the list. While Nigeria is much poorer than the
other countries, it has roughly three times the population of South Korea. The Nigerian case
is addressed below. See infra notes 355-59 and accompanying text.
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phenomenon. Media liberalization is continuing worldwide, and
distribution channels are proliferating, creating an insatiable demand for
content. Meanwhile, Hollywood's cost structure continues to mushroom
out of control, even as digital technologies lower its competitors' costs. 3"
Korea is hardly the only place recovering from an authoritarian past, and
even where free speech prevails, the lack of a competitive domestic
audiovisual base often means there is pent-up demand for local content. As
for Koreans being naturally charismatic, an element of faddishness
underlies such appraisals. Other countries have time yet to enjoy their 15
minutes of fame.
The Korean approach may not work for everyone.313 Contexts vary,
and policy needs to adapt. However, for most countries, replicating the
functional parameters of the Korean model represents the best chance to at
least put themselves in a position to compete. Indeed, while South Korea's
successful implementation of decentralized, market-based policies remains
the single best example of cultural protectionism in a trade-friendly guise,
other audiovisual industries have prospered under analogous conditions.
The following case studies from India, Hong Kong, and Nigeria echo and
amplify the lessons from the Korean Wave.
C. Other Case Studies
1. Diversity as a Selling Point: Bollywood Goes Global
All three countries feature commercially vibrant film industries that
export widely. India boasts the world's largest film industry measured by
annual production and ticket sales. 3 14 Nigeria ranks in the top three by
audience and volume of production. 315 Until recently, Hong Kong ranked
among the top five producers, and as an exporter, it was second only to
Hollywood.3 1  They each produce movies catering to popular audiences
squarely in the commercial mainstream, but they differentiate their movies
from competing Hollywood offerings through a distinctive style of
filmmaking that showcases significant aspects of their respective cultural
311 COWEN, supra note 133, at 99.
312 Koreans may be especially talented at doing the sensitive machismo shtick, but
sensitive machismo is not the only way to sell pictures. Other countries need to locate their
own niches. Every culture has its stories to tell; it's just a matter of finding the right idiom
and vehicle.
33 See COWEN, supra note 133, at 101 (markets are fickle). The claim here is not that the
Korean model guarantees success. This Article argues only that decentralized, market-based
policies represent a more effective approach than alternative models such as state patronage.
314 THE ECoNOMIST, POCKET WORLD IN FIGURES 96 (2009).
315 See Stevina U. Evuleocha, Nollywood and the Home Video Revolution: Implications
for Marketing Videofilm in Africa, 3 INT'L J. EMERGING MARKETS 407, 407 (2008).
316 COWEN, supra note 55, at 82.
115
HeinOnline  -- 31 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 115 2011
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 31:63 (2011)
heritage. " In other words, rather than sacrificing culture on the altar of
commercialism, these industries have made cultural diversity a source of
competitive strength. As with the Korean Wave, their films appeal to
audiences because of the cultural content embedded within them.
Moreover, this phenomenon of "diversity as a selling point" applies just as
strongly to success in export markets, contradicting the received wisdom
that globalization pushes inexorably toward cultural homogenization.'
India's film industry offers a particularly compelling example because
an abrupt change in government policy in the 1990s serves as a kind of
natural experiment. In the decades prior, India's commercial film
industry-centered in Mumbai and universally known as Bollywood-was
crippled by protectionist policies, heavy-handed regulation, punitive
taxation, and severe export controls. 3 19 Denied access to conventional
finance, the industry increasingly relied on mafia-controlled loan-sharks-
in effect a form of private patronage that created a far worse dependency
than its European public analogue.
317 See DAVID BORDWELL, PLANET HONG KONG: POPULAR CINEMA AND THE ART OF
ENTERTAINMENT 72-79 (2000) (describing Shaolin kung fu traditions, stylized Peking Opera
elements, as well as contemporary and historical themes in Hong Kong movies); Femi
Shaka, Rethinking the Nigerian Video Film Industry: Technological Fascination and the
Domestication Game, in AFRICAN VIDEO FILM TODAY 41, 47 (Foluke Ogunleye ed., 2003)
(noting folkloric elements pervasive in Nigerian films); Nigeria's Film Industry: Nollywood
Dreams, THE ECONOMIST, July 26, 2006, at 62 (describing social commentary); Ashish
Rajadhyaksha, The "Bollywoodization" of the Indian Cinema: Cultural Nationalism in a
Global Arena, in GLOBAL BOLLYWOOD 17, 34-39 (Anandam P. Kayoori & Aswin
Punathambekar eds., 2008) (describing distinctive cultural content of Indian movies).
318 See BORDWELL, supra note 317, at 81; Ngoloma Katsuva, Nigerian Home Video Films
and the Congolese Audience: A Similarity of Cultures, in AFRICAN VIDEO FILM TODAY,
supra note 317, at 91, 96; Rajadhyaksha, supra note 317, at 37. For example, the surprise
success of 2009 Academy Award-wining Best Picture SLUMDOG MILLIONAIRE rested on its
unvarnished portrayal of Mumbai's urban underside: shanty-settlements, poverty, ethnic
pogroms, child abuse, soul-less development, corrupt media, and police brutality.
Technically a British production, SLUMDOG was nonetheless filmed in India with a mostly
Indian cast, Indian co-director, Indian music, and based on an Indian novel. New Investors
and Foreign Audiences Are Creating a New Script for Bollywood, INDIA
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON, May 21, 2009, available at http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/
india/article.cfm?articleid-4378 [hereinafter New Script for Bollywood].
319 While India never developed a full-blown state patronage regime as in Europe, India's
rulers for years regarded its commercialized film industry as faintly embarrassing. They saw
culture as an ideological project to promote nation-building and focused on developing a
"parallel cinema" that would serve this "pedagogical mission." Rajadhyaksha, supra note
317, at 29-30. Government also treated Bollywood as a cash cow to be milked through
exorbitant "entertainment taxes" with rates as high as 167%. Tejaswini Ganti, Mumbai
versus Bollywood: The Hindi Film Industry and the Politics of Cultural Heritage in
Contemporary India, in GLOBAL BOLLYWOOD, supra note 317, at 52, 66; Arpita Mukherjee,
Audio- Visual Policies and International Trade: The Case of India, in CULTURAL DIVERSITY
AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION, supra note 2, at 218, 237.
320 Money-laundering kept operations on a strictly cash basis, rife with murky
accounting, shambolic management, and fly-by-night production that made Bollywood
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Bollywood movies during this period stagnated into predictable
formulas. Sheltered from foreign competition and with the world's largest
film-going audiences in their pocket, 3  Bollywood producers churned out
an endless stream of "musical melodramas" revolving around handsome,
muscular heroes whose struggles to defeat the obligatory snarling villain
and to win the girl were interspersed with random song and dance numbers
bearing little or no relation to the meandering-if-predictable plot.3 22 Little
effort went into character-development or narrative; story-lines were widely
recycled, often remakes of Hollywood hits, sometimes with dialogue and
even camera angles lifted wholesale.3 2 3
Reforms starting in the 1990s began to change all of that. Formal
industry recognition allowed film studios to issue stock, obtain bank loans,
and purchase insurance. "Corporatizing" placed industry finances on a
more secure foundation and forced studios to professionalize their
operations from top to bottom.324 Paralleling Korea's chaebol, Indian's
industrial conglomerates and venture capitalist began to take interest.3 25
Relaxed restrictions on foreign direct investment also brought Western
moguls flocking to India, bringing with them valuable contacts, know-how,
and investments that hastened the transformation of India's audiovisual
industries. 32 6
As with the Korean Wave, Bollywood's commercial overhaul gave it
the resources and institutional capabilities to become more ambitious
creatively. Instead of recycling tired formulas built around bankable stars,
filmmakers began to emphasize storytelling and improved production
values.327  Investing in multiple projects allowed studios to take more
resemble an "overgrown cottage industry." Manjeet Kripalani & Ron Grover, Bollywood:
Can New Money Create a World-Class Film Industry in India?, Bus. WK, Dec. 2, 2002,
available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/02 48/b3810013.htm. By the
1980s, the infiltration of mafia finance had progressed to the extent that gangsters began to
dictate casting and even story-lines, with occasionally lethal side effects far more sinister
than bureaucratic meddling. Id.
321 Regulators restricted foreign competition by limiting import licenses to artistic films,
capping imports at 100 per year and prohibiting dubbing. Mukherjee, supra note 319, at
231.
322 Kripalani & Grover, supra note 320.
323 Marketplace: Bollywood's Copycat Film Industry (American Public Media radio
broadcast Mar. 17, 2008), available at http://marketplace.publicradio.org/display/web/2008/
03/17/bollywood copycats/.
324 See Kripalani & Grover, supra note 320; New Script for Bollywood, supra note 318.
325 Kripalani & Grover, supra note 320; Daya Kishan Thussu, The Globalization of
"Bollywood"-The Hype and Hope, in GLOBAL BOLLYWOOD, supra note 317, at 97, 105-06.
326 New Script for Bollywood, supra note 318. Unrestricted competition from Hollywood
imports also further pressured Indian filmmakers to raise their game. Rajadhyaksha, supra
note 317, at 23.
327 DEREK BOSE, BRAND BOLLYWOOD: A NEw GLOBAL ENTERTAINMENT ORDER 23
(2006); K. MoTI GOKULSING & WIMAL DISSANAYAKE, INDIAN POPULAR CINEMA: A
NARRATIVE OF CULTURAL CHANGE 111 (2d ed. 2004).
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chances on innovative and diverse genre films, incorporating fresh
328directorial visions. By appealing to sophisticated urban audiences who
paid top dollar to see new releases in modem multiplexes, Bollywood films
gained new respect at home and abroad.329
Meanwhile, India's removal of export controls opened up a whole
world (literally) of untapped markets. Overseas box office revenues
leaped tenfold in the decade spanning India's reforms, from a paltry $10
million at the end of the 1980s to $111 million by 2001, and it has more
than doubled since.331 Catering to such "premium" markets has reinforced
Bollywood's creative ambitions.3 32 As with Korea, India belies claims that
catering to a global audience requires "dumbing down" content and
sacrificing cultural authenticity.333 Bollywood still churns out formulaic,
mass market musicals targeted at rural audiences. However, it now sells
more sophisticated, plot-driven and socially conscious fare that caters to
both urban professionals at home and foreign audiences abroad. If
328 New Script for Bollywood, supra note 318. Among the innovations were films
without music (!) and films dealing with serious social or historical issues, e.g. "Fire"
(lesbianism) and "Asoka" (famous king). See Rajadhyaksha, supra note 317, at 36-39;
Sunder supra note 152, at 84-85.
329 BOSE, supra note 327, at 163-64; New Script for Bollywood, supra note 318; The
Worldwide Cinema Boom: The Box Office Strikes Back, THE ECONOMIST, May 8, 2010, at
63.
330 BOSE, supra note 327, at 63; Thussu, supra note 325, at 100; Ayyappa Prasad, Films
Don 't Believe in Borders, SCREEN, Aug. 29, 2003, available at http://www.screenindia.com/
old/fullstory.php?content id=5670. Bollywood has scored hits in such nontraditional
markets as China and Japan. Thussu, supra note 325, at 110; Gautaman Bhaskaran,
Rajnikanth Casts Spell on Japaense Viewers, THE HINDu, Jan. 6, 2002, available at
http://www.hinduonnet.com/2002/01/06/stories/2002010601320900.htm; It's India-Japan
Friendship Year, THE HINDU, Dec. 15, 2006, available at http://www.hindu.com/2006/12/
15/stories/2006121506571400.htm. Indian films are currently exported to around 95
countries. Mukherjee supra note 319, at 244.
331 Shanti Kumar, Hollywood, Bollywood, Tollywood: Redefining the Global in Indian
Cinema, in GLOBAL BOLLYWOOD, supra note 317, at 79, 92; Mukhejee supra note 319, at
244; Thussu, supra note 325, at 110. A 2005 UNESCO Report forecast up to 50% export
growth annually. UNESCO, supra note 190, at 6-7.
332 Overseas audiences, as well as wealthier, better educated domestic ones are exposed
to global cinema, and thus expect more. Thussu, supra note 325, at 111.
33 Some grumble that "Manhattan-in-Mumbai" films depicting Indian diaspora
communities detract from a focus on the indigenous Indian experience. Cf Helena Barnard
& Krista Tuomi, How Demand Sophistication (De-)limits Economic Upgrading: Comparing
the Film Industries of South Africa and Nigeria (Nollywood), 15 INDUS. & INNOVATION 647,
648 (explaining how exposure to global media conditions audiences to expect higher quality
content from domestic producers). However, these films are popular in India as well and for
good reason; emigration is very much a fact of life, and one to which almost every urban
middle class family has a connection. Likewise, protests over socially controversial issues
raised by such films (e.g. divorce, adultery) arguably reflect less a betrayal of Indian values
than a marker of social change. Cf Atticus Narain, "Bring Back the Old Films, Our Culture
is in Disrepute": Hindi Film and the Construction of Femininity in Guyana, in GLOBAL
BOLLYWOOD, supra note 317, at 164, 172.
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anything, recent films have accentuated Bollywood's distinctive style and
reaffirmed India's cultural heritage in reaction to globalization.334 Rather
than dragging the cultural focal point inexorably down the gutter, export
markets have contributed to both the quality and diversity of Indian film. 3 35
2. Beyond Bollywood: Decentralized A idfor Indian Regional Film
The role of India's government in Bollywood's transformation was
essentially negative. Beyond removing the dysfunctional components of its
prior regime, the state essentially stepped aside and let the market operate.
However, Bollywood represents only part of India's diverse film industry.
Bollywood is the top producer by market share and the only one whose
films enjoy widespread national distribution, but India has several other
major regional industries, each based around a regional language.33 6
Whereas Bollywood's commercial revival represents a triumph of laissez
faire policy, India's provincial authorities have actively intervened to
support regional production. In this respect, Indian regional film echoes a
different aspect of the Korean experience: the use of decentralized support
mechanisms. As in South Korea, India's successful deployment of direct
subsidies provides an instructive contrast to European patronage.
India's provinces offer much less support to their local industries than
Europe does. However, such aid has arguably been more effective because
it comes predominantly in the form of tax rebates for exhibition of local
films. 3 37  Unlike state patronage, the rebates stimulate demand for local
content through discounted tickets, rather than merely increasing the
supply. 3 3 8 As such, they offer another notable example of decentralized,
334 GOKULSING & DISSANAYAKE, supra note 327, at 4-5. In so doing, such films cater to
diaspora audiences' nostalgia for "Mother India." Id. In fact, the popularity of Bollywood
overseas has always sprung from offering a distinct alternative to Western films. In Muslim
societies in the Middle East and Africa, the chaste nature of Bollywood romances appeal to
conservative morals. The Soviet Union valued Indian movies for their supposed rejection of
capitalist values. See Narain, supra note 333, at 164. Others value its portrayals of life in a
developing country or are simply enthralled by the song and dance.
335 See GOKULSING & DISSANAYAKE, supra note 327, at 3-4; BOSE, supra note 327, at 27
(giving examples of films that bombed at home but recouped earnings overseas).
336 While Bollywood remains the dominant commercial producer, it accounts for only a
quarter of the films India makes annually. By output, Bollywood actually ranks second to
the Telugu film industry ("Tollywood"), which churns out over 250 films annually.
UNESCO, supra note 190, at 10.
m Some provinces offer direct production subsidies too but restrict these to low budget
art films. See, e.g., INFO & PuB. RELATIONS DEP'T, GOVERNMENT OF TAMIL NADU, POLICY
NOTE: 2002-2003, available at http://www.tn.gov.in/policynotes/archives/policy2002_03/
ipr2002-03-b.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2010).
338 Indian states levy an "entertainment tax" on cinema box office, which can be as much
as 60% of ticket prices. Ganti, supra note 319, at 66. Rebating tax on local films gives
distributors a strong incentive to book local films as they can earn a higher profit margin.
Such rebates are market-based and distribution-focused, and they operate in a decentralized,
non-discriminatory manner.
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distribution-oriented subsidies. Such indirect support mechanisms have
enabled India to sustain multiple film industries, each of which produce
commercially successful films rooted in local culture and politics.339
3. Size Isn't Everything: Hong Kong's Kung Fu Hustle
India's regions show how decentralized, market-based measures can
sustain vibrant filmmaking even in relatively small markets competing
against a dominant rival. To be sure, all things being equal, countries with
larger domestic market bases have an advantage.340 However, not all big
countries are audiovisual heavyweights: Brazil has 50% more people than
Japan but produces less than a tenth as many films. 341  Pakistan and
Bangladesh both have around 160 million people and share many historical
and cultural affinities as well as proximity to India, but despite Pakistan's
higher per capita income, it managed only a sixth of Bangladesh's annual
film output.3
Other factors may also underpin success in nurturing indigenous
industries. Countries whose cultural traditions and current realities are far
removed from the United States are likely to have an easier time competing
with American exports because the "cultural discount" applied to non-
indigenous content is greater.343 Perhaps counter-intuitively, poor countries
may also have an advantage because they can more successfully compete in
the bottom end of the market. 34 Of all these factors, however, export
capacity represents the biggest wildcard in the deck.
Hong Kong provides an extreme example of how export-driven
economies of scale can be leveraged to trump domestic market size. In the
1970s and 1980s, Hong Kong was a film exporter second only to
Hollywood. Despite a population of only seven million people, Hong
3 GOKULSING & DISSANAYAKE, supra note 327, at 130-39.
340 WILDMAN & SIWEK, supra note 28, at 101-11.
341 Brazil had 231 million people vs. Japan's 128 million in 2009, but Brazil accounted
for only 27 feature films in 2006 against Japan's 417. UNESCO, supra note 190, at 12, 14.
Brazil does export lots of TV shows, exploiting its clout as an audiovisual giant in this
domain. See Jose Marques de Melo, Development of the Audiovisual Industry in Brazilfrom
Importer to Exporter of Television Programming, 20 CAN. J. COMM. 317 (1995).
342 Compare Number of the Certified Films in the Year of 2009-2010, BANGLADESH FILM
CENSOR BOARD, http://www.fcb-bd.org/index.php?option=com content&view-article&id=
52&Itemid=50 (last visited Oct. 19, 2010) (63 films made in 2009-2010), with Nirupama
Subramanian, We are Lagging Behind, THE HINDU, Feb. 21, 2010, available at
http://www.hindu.com/mag/2010/02/21/stories/2010022150030200.htm (twelve films in
Pakistan in 2009).
343 Greater cultural distance means Western imports come across as more "foreign" and
less accessible to local audiences who have a correspondingly stronger preference for
indigenous works. Omar Lizardo, Globalization and Culture: A Sociological Perspective,
(Ctr. for the Study of Global Politics & Power, Working Paper No. CSGP 07/8), available at
http://www.trentu.ca/globalpolitics/documents/Lizardo_07_8.pdf.
3 Id.
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Kong's kung fu blockbusters dominated box offices across East and
Southeast Asia. 34 5 Tapping into this regional audience enabled Hong Kong
studios to invest in ambitious, cutting edge productions on a scale far
beyond what Hong Kong's tiny domestic market could sustain on its
own. 34 6 Although Hong Kong's film industry has declined somewhat in
recent years, it still retains a cultural influence beyond all proportion to its
size.
4. Digital Nollywood: How Technology Levels the Playing Field
Hong Kong's success in leveraging export revenues to build its
domestic industry may have been exceptional. However, market trends are
shifting in ways that lower the barriers to entry for diverse filmmakers. 34 7
In particular, the widespread adoption of digital technologies reduces the
cost of producing and distributing audiovisual content, expands potential
revenues that can be generated, and prolongs the timeframe over which
such revenue streams remain viable.
The proliferation of new distribution channels has reduced
filmmakers' dependence on theatrical distribution as the sole means to
recover their investment. 4 Satellite and cable broadcast can afford to
dedicate entire channels to specialty film content, and the cost of
distributing digital online content has become trivial. Far from ruining
Hollywood as it initially feared, video and DVD sales have become
Hollywood's salvation. Bollywood and Hong Kong's film industry have
345 COWEN, supra note 55, at 82; WORLD BANK, World Development Indicators:
Population 2009, available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/
Resources/POP.pdf; Sek Kei, A Brief Historical Tour of the Hong Kong Martial Arts Film,
31 BRIGHT LIGHTS FILM J. 215, 216 (2001).
346 Some might argue that Hong Kong's small population is beside the point, given the
much larger Chinese diaspora community. Yet, Hong Kong hardly had a lock on the
overseas Chinese market, beating out much larger regional competitors, including Taiwan,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Japan, Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam, all of whom have much
bigger populations. Hong Kong produced films in Cantonese rather than the much more
widely-spoken Mandarin dialect. And, most of the countries that received Hong Kong's film
exports contained only small numbers of Chinese ethnic minorities. (The Mainland Chinese
market, in the throes of the Cultural Revolution, was largely closed during this period.) Kei,
supra note 345, at 219.
347 See J.P. Singh, Culture or Commerce? A Comparative Assessment of International
Interactions and Developing Countries at UNESCO, WTO, and Beyond, 8 INT'L STUD.
PERSP. 36, 49 (2007) (describing demand and sourcing of financing for non-Western
filmmaking). See also Cindy Wong, Producing Film Knowledge, Producing Films: Festivals
in a New World 17 (May 21, 2008) (unpublished manuscript presented at the annual meeting
of the International Communication Association, Montreal, Canada), available at
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p mla aparesearch citation/2/3/3/9/9/pages233992/p23
3992-1.php (describing global network of film festivals keen to discover up-and-coming
talent).
348 Ananda Mitra, Bollyweb: Search for Bollywood on the Web and See What Happens!,
in GLOBAL BOLLYWOOD, supra note 317, at 268, 271, 277.
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also profited mightily from home video sales.3 49 Ethnic groceries stores
stock videos and DVDs catering to diaspora audiences. Mail-order services
such as Netflix boast enormous catalogues catering to all manner of
specialty interests.3 50  The advent of on-demand video-streaming could
potentially bring even greater revenues. 351  Meanwhile, online
recommendations tools, social network media, content tagging, and other
third party reviewing mechanisms can help spread the word about
innovative content, generating valuable "buzz" while bypassing mainstream
media. 352
Digital technologies also reduce the cost of production. Consumer
class filming, sound recording, and editing equipment for sale today enable
near-professional quality films, dramatically reducing the investments
required for filmmaking in terms of both capital outlays and man-hours.353
The lower cost thresholds for digital filmmaking make it possible to recoup
investments on a much smaller revenue base than a few decades prior.
Nigeria's video film industry-widely known as "Nollywood"-
provides an intriguing example of a major commercial film industry built
almost exclusively around home video distribution. 355  From the start,
Nollywood has taken advantage of digital technologies for both distribution
356
and production. Remarkably, Nollywood has thrived without
349 Bose, supra note 327, at 55; Adrian Athique, The Global Dynamics of Indian Media
Piracy: Export Markets, Playback Media and the Informal Economy, 30 MEDIA CULTURE
Soc'Y 699, 703-04 (2008). On Netflix, Bollywood movies account for 100,000 rentals each
month. See Chris Anderson, The Long Tail, WIRED 12.10, Oct. 2004, available at
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/1 2.10/tail.html?pg=1&topic-tail&topic set.
350 Anderson, supra note 349, at 123.
351 See Brooks Barnes, Studios' Quest for Life After DVDs, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2009, at
Bl.
352 On Netflix, about 60% of all rentals come from recommendations by its Cinematch
system. Clive Thompson, If You Liked This, You're Sure to Love That, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21,
2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/23/magazine/23Netflix-t.html; Burri-
Nenova, supra note 52, at 35-36 (describing social media and tagging as effective filtering
tools).
SI.S. Popoola, Nigeria and the Challenges of Violent Video Films, in AFRICAN VIDEO
FILM TODAY, supra note 317, at 129, 131; Mitra, supra note 348, at 268, 271, 277.
354 You can make and bring to market a decent-looking film on a shoestring budget in a
way that was not possible 30 years ago. Cf Patrick J. Ebewo, The Emerging Video Film
Industry in Nigeria: Challenges and Prospects, 59 J. FILM & VIDEO 46, 49 (2007)
(explaining how advancements in film technology have improved the visual quality of low
budget films in Nigeria).
3 E.M. Osei-Hwere, & P.V. Osei-Hwere, Nollywood: A Multilevel Analysis of the
International Flow of Nigerian Video Films, 7, 9 (unpublished manuscript presented to the
2008 Conference of the International Communication Association, May 2008, Montreal,
Canada), available at http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p mla apa research-citation/
2/3/3/8/9/p233897_index.html.
356 See id. at 9; Shaka, supra note 317, at 49.
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government support and without even a functioning copyright system.357
Nigeria films dominate TV screens all over Africa and increasingly enjoy
global distribution. 358 The industry's success provides a powerful example
of how new technologies are enabling the democratization of cultural
production, and its success has already spawned regional imitators.s 9
Extrapolating from the success of digital film industries in Nollywood
and elsewhere, it is possible to argue that cultural protectionism will
become superfluous as technology and economics tilt decisively in favor of
diverse forms of cultural production.3 60 However, there are just as many
reasons to think that digital technologies will entrench the existing
advantage of Big Content conglomerates. 1 The true diversity potential of
362the digital era remains unproven.
Furthermore, markets are sticky, and inertia rules supreme. Even if the
playing field has been leveled somewhat, indigenous audiovisual industries
are unlikely to pop up overnight in a field of digital dreams. If we accept
that cultural diversity is a public good, there remains a strong case for
government initiative to catalyze the collective action and investments
needed to provide that public good, rather than waiting for the market to
deliver on its own.
The case for government involvement has particular force when it
357 It is wrong, however, to view Nollywood's emergence as purely a market
phenomenon. Prior government investment in Nigerian television had created an
exceptionally rich pool of highly trained talent and technical expertise whose sudden
availability (due to TV privatization) coincided with the launch of Nollywood video
production. In other words, state patronage in one audiovisual domain translated into an
indirect subsidy for the other. See Kaitlin Mara, Open Business Systems Fill Gap in
Mainstream Entertainment Industry, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Sept. 12, 2008), http://www.ip-
watch.org/weblog/2008/09/12/open-business-systems-fill-gap-in-mainstream-entertainment-
industry/.
358 Evuleocha, supra note 315, at 409-11; Osei-Hwere & Osei-Hwere, supra note 355, at
4-5.
359 Nollywood's regional imitators include Uganda's "Ugowood" and Kenya's
"Riverwood." Id.
360 See Anderson, supra note 349, at 6 (arguing the age of the blockbuster is over). Some
argue further that the very notion of commercialized culture industries is pass6. See YOCHAI
BENKLER, WEALTH OF NETWORKS 23-24 (2006) (hailing new era of digital "folk culture");
Eben Moglen, Anarchism Triumphant: Free Software and the Death of Copyright, 4 FIRST
MONDAY (1999), http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fn/article/view/684/
594.
361 See MATTHEW HINDMAN, THE MYTH OF DIGITAL DEMOCRACY 38-57, 82-101 (2009)
(arguing that online technologies favor established voices); Wright, supra note 2, at 431-32
(describing how Big Media's marketing clout translates to digital environment); DAN
SCHILLER, DIGITAL CAPITALISM: NETWORKING THE GLOBAL MARKET SYSTEM (2000)
(technology accentuates Big Capital's advantage). Benkler also warns of efforts by giant
content producers to subvert digital technologies to entrench their position. See BENKLER,
supra note 360, at 23-26.
362 See BENKLER, supra note 360, at 23 (emphasizing contingent nature of digital
transformation).
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comes to developing export markets.363  Purely domestic industries will
have difficulty competing in an era of globalized content distribution.
However, the obstacles to international content distribution are particularly
daunting for market actors to negotiate on their own.364 Left unaddressed,
these barriers may prevent diverse filmmakers from exploiting the global
economies of scale they need to survive. Governments should therefore
look for ways to tip global markets to be more receptive to diverse content.
This is not to say that government is all-wise and all-knowing.
Obviously, it is not (as the patronage model proves). However, for states
that value cultural diversity and care about nurturing indigenous audiovisual
capabilities, there is still a place for targeted government interventions in
many-if not most-cases. Korea shows the difference that proactive
government policy can make.
IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The rapid evolution of globalization and digital technology make
predictions a risky game. Prospects for cultural diversity are probably not
quite as glowing as cybertopian hype suggests nor as bleak as the cultural
pessimists' dirges. Most countries will remain committed to engaging in
some form of cultural protectionism for the foreseeable future regardless.
The more important question is what kind.
A. Domestic Policy
At the national level, the recommendations seem simple: Refashion
cultural protectionism from patronage into decentralized, market-based
policies. Variations in national context make a standardized template for
363 To be sure, industry groups can organize privately to overcome obstacles. Cf Film
Exporters of Southern States Form Association-To Tap Non-traditional Markets, THE
HINDU BUSINESSLINE, Apr. 21, 2003, available at http://www.blonnet.com/2003/04/21/
stories/2003042101620300.htm. However, government has far more leverage to nudge
industry in a desired direction. Moreover, government can act as a clearinghouse for
information that benefits industry as a whole; it also has a public motivation that individual
entrepreneurs may lack.
3 See Christian Volpe Martincus & Jer6nimo Carballo, Is Export Promotion Effective in
Developing Countries? Firm-level Evidence on the Intensive and the Extensive Margins of
Exports, 76 J. INT'L ECON 89, 104 (2008) (addressing the difficulty Peruvian businesses
experience in expanding to new markets). Merely assembling the paperwork and
paraphernalia required for international film distribution can confound aspiring filmmakers.
See Mark Steven Bosko, Prepare Your Film for Market: Top Tips for Film Distribution,
CREATE SPACE (Aug. 28, 2009, 4:19 PM), https://csp-mw-landing.s3.amazonaws.com/
PrepareYourFilmForMarket.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2010). Building distribution networks
requires specialized expertise and economies of scale. Scott, supra note 73, at 4. There is
therefore a chicken-and-egg problem in that you need global revenues to be a player but
cannot compete effectively without them.
365 The market need not constitute the sole criterion of cultural value, but it should
remain the dominant one.
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reform inadvisable.366 Korean and Indian regional films offer two models
of decentralized support; others exist as well. 3 67  The main thing is to
choose policy tools that meet functional criteria. Government should act
primarily through indirect mechanisms that target capabilities, encourage
private investment, and facilitate distribution. The overriding goal should
be to keep filmmakers responsive to audiences rather than bureaucrats.
The comparison between India's regional film support and European
patronage is particularly instructive. Regional filmmakers in India thrive in
markets of 30 to 80 million people-roughly the same size as the larger
368European countries. Both compete directly against a dominant film
producer in their home markets. The position of Indian regional film vis-A-
vis Bollywood parallels European cinema's relationship to Hollywood.
Roughly 40% of India's populace speak fluent Hindi, which is the same
percentage as Bollywood's market share of the national box office. 3 69 By
contrast, while English-speakers similarly account for about 40% of the
combined European-North American market, Hollywood enjoys a market
share double that amount.
The comparative success of India's regional film industries vis-d-vis
Europe can arguably be ascribed to its decentralized funding model. In
both cases, the local industries compete against a dominant hegemon that
enjoys economies of scale and market power. Yet, such advantages are
offset by the preference of local audiences for local stories-provided they
are offered choices of equivalent quality. European patronage has largely
failed to deliver this alternative. India's regional players show that the
effort is not beyond reach even operating at far lower subsidy levels than in
Europe.
Of all the Continental European film industries, the one that has
enjoyed the most consistent commercial success in recent decades is
France. French officials often attribute this to higher subsidy levels
compared to their neighbors. Yet, Indian regional film shows what matters
is not just how much money you spend, but also how you spend it.370 In
366 For example, some countries have underdeveloped finance sectors in which
filmmakers have difficulty purchasing completion bonds and export insurance; others have
run-down cinemas that could benefit from upgrades and digital conversion. Govemment
should not attempt to solve all problems in the target industry, but rather it should identify
weak links and prioritize accordingly.
367 See Feigenbaum, supra note 192, at 22-23 (investment reinsurance proposal);
COWEN, supra note 133, at 33-35 (non-profit tax deduction model); DALE, supra note 33, at
295-301 (tax sheltered film investment vehicles).
368 To take the two largest regions in India: Tamil Nadu has about 62 million people-
roughly the same as France. Andhra Pradesh has about 82 million-similar to Germany.
WIKIPEDIA, List of States and Union Territories of India by Population,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List-of states and union territories of India by-population,
(last visited Feb. 5, 2011).
369 Id.
370 As argued above, much of European patronage may actually be counterproductive.
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fact, France does have a comparative advantage here as well. It
supplements its basic patronage spending with a fairly extensive array of
decentralized subsidies that comport well with the model advocated in this
Article."' France's reliance on such decentralized, market-oriented
mechanisms sets it apart from its European peers and arguably explains
France's relative success in preserving a commercially viable film
industry.37 2
Decentralized subsidies keep the focus on building a cultural
infrastructure that can sustain itself commercially. 7 A thriving, profitable
industry will ensure the critical mass of creative talent, technical
capabilities, finance, and distribution to support a diversity of projects.3 74
Filmmakers are creative types. There will always be some among them
who want to "make art" or "engage in dialogue" with their compatriots.
Revenues from blockbusters will indirectly support such projects, just as
"made for export" films can sustain a shared infrastructure used to make
more locally-oriented fare.
A sterling example of filmmaking along these lines, in fact, can be
found in France. Luc Besson's EuropaCorp has been one of the most
commercially successful European film studios in recent years and one of
the few whose films regularly garner global distribution. Many of Besson's
most successful movies are filmed in English, using Hollywood actors and
feature action-packed plots typical of Hollywood blockbusters.3 75 Besson is
widely reviled by the French cultural establishment for betraying France's
auteur tradition. Yet, whatever their opinion of his works as cultural
artifacts, French industry officials are only too happy to bask in
EuropaCor's box office success, which burnishes figures for the industry
as a whole. 76
371 France is the only major European film producer that awards the majority of its direct
state aid through "automatic" subsidies tied to box office performance as opposed to
culturally selective grants. By contrast, over half of the 15 EU Member States in 1995
awarded 90% or more of subsidies on a selective basis. Cocq & Messerlin, supra note 64, at
11. France also supplies a variety of other indirect subsidies on a non-discriminatory basis
(Sofica tax shelters, special unemployment benefits for "creatives," infrastructure grants,
etc.). Id. at 14; Messerlin & Cocq, supra note 70, at 9 & n.14.
372 France's decentralized aid partially offsets its greater reliance on direct patronage
mechanisms overall.
3 This is not to say governments cannot subsidize Masterpiece Theater or the
Metropolitan Opera. There is a case for direct government assistance at the margins,
especially for truly avant garde work where market support is insufficient. Thus, this Article
advocates a reweighing of priorities, not a complete break with existing funding patterns.
374 See DALE, supra note 33, at 159-60; COWEN, supra note 133, at 89-90.
3s Jaime Wolf, Luc Besson: The Most Hollywood of French Filmmakers, N.Y. TIMES,
May 20, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/20/arts/20iht-20besson.
5796788.html.
376 Isabelle Vanderschelden, Luc Besson's Ambition: EuropaCorp as a European Major
for the 21st Century, 5 STUD. EUR. CINEMA 91, 92 (2008).
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Cultural protectionists often argue that targeting export markets means
making Hollywood "clone" films at the expense of cultural
distinctiveness. 377 If you just focus on Besson's big-budget hits, the charge
seems merited. Yet, this zero-sum calculus is incomplete. It ignores
EuropaCorp's smaller-budget films aimed mainly at domestic audiences,
which are much more "French" in sensibility. It also overlooks the benefits
of the creative infrastructure that EuropaCorp's global revenues support.
EuropaCorp has built a state-of-the-art production facility outside Paris that
even non-EuropaCorp productions use. Besson has helped to educate a
new generation of directors in the art of popular filmmaking.37 9 His studio
employs an array of technicians and creative talent who contribute to other
French films. EuropaCorp has also developed special effects technologies
that other French filmmakers have embraced. In short, the creative and
technical spillovers from Besson's "clone films" benefit French cinema
across the board. EuropaCorp, in turn, benefits from the decentralized
aspects of French audiovisual finance, if not its culturally selective
380patronage.
EuropaCorp's example underscores the extent to which cultural
vitality goes hand in hand with commercial prosperity. To make it work,
you have to offer audiences content they want to watch. Trying to cram
Culture-with-a-capital-"C" down people's throats is like serving Brussels
sprouts in a high school cafeteria. You may feel good about it, but it is
ultimately futile. Culture is a living, breathing thing. Trust it to grow
unfettered.
EuropaCorp also points to the second key pillar of a successful cultural
protection policy: export capacity. Export markets generate vital economies
of scale. That exporting films sometimes requires compromises to
authenticity should not blind cultural protectionists to its benefits. As
EuropaCorp shows, export vs. domestic is not a zero-sum game. Moreover,
as the Korean, Nigerian, and Indian cases all testify, cultural distinctiveness
3n COWEN, supra note 133, at 99-101.
3 John Hopewell & Tobias Grey, Luc Besson to Build Mega Studio, VARIETY, June 11
2009, available at http://www.variety.com/article/VR11 18004816?refCatld=3599.
379 Ali Jaafar, Transporting Talent: How an International Movie Franchise Turned
EuropaCorp into a Film School, VARIETY, May 11-17, 2009, at A44.
380 EuropaCorp is one the biggest recipients of French "automatic" subsidies and also
raises money through Sofica tax shelters funded by private investors. Thus, it has no need to
genuflect before sacred cows of auteur filmmaking. Vanderschelden, supra note 376, at 96.
381 This is not to deny that popular culture generates much forgettable dross. But see
COWEN, supra note 122, at 31, 39-40 (describing how critics lack the necessary distance to
appraise contemporary culture and prematurely discount the value of cultural innovations
when measured against the timeless glories of past achievement). Regardless, efforts to
target diversity directly by subsidizing "artistic" or "authentic" content are likely to prove
self-defeating and unsustainable without a commercially viable foundation (even setting
aside the free speech concerns such efforts implicate). Cultural protectionism should thus
concentrate more on industrial policy than cultural.
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can be a selling point. With Hollywood blockbusters converging upon
cookie cutter cartoon formulas, plenty of untapped demand remains for
diverse content.382  As an emerging global middle class redirects surplus
income to leisure activities, demand for such "long-tail" content will
continue to grow.383 In the past, capacity constraints and distribution
bottlenecks prevented such demand from being satisfied. Global hits
seemed to arise from diverse filmmakers only by accident.3 84 Yet digital
technologies now offer filmmakers more options to get their products to
market.
Pursuing diversity through trade will finally move us beyond the
"culture vs. commerce" impasse. 385  Not only will an export-oriented
cultural protectionism inherently lead to less trade-restrictive policies, but
the decentralized policies it relies on are also far less likely to run afoul of
WTO trade rules compared to traditional patronage mechanisms.386
We should therefore ask: How can we best develop diversity-friendly
export markets? Korea and other countries surveyed in this Article employ
a fairly standard toolkit of audiovisual export promotion: film festivals,
trade fairs, co-production agreements, and the like. The reality, however, is
that countries have limited ability to unilaterally promote audiovisual sales
beyond their borders. Moreover, WTO rules actively constrain export-
oriented protectionism. For example, the Subsidies Code imposes a blanket
382 Indeed, all things being equal, one might expect a global audiovisual market to
support greater diversity in film choices in the same way that big cities offer a richer
selection of ethnic restaurants. See JOEL WALDFOGEL, THE TYRANNY OF THE MARKET 68
(2007). The problem is that the structure of audiovisual production leads to a winners-take-
all outcome dominated by big-budget blockbuster films. Id. at 105. Limited theatrical
exhibition space is increasingly monopolized by a handful of global releases. See John
Powers: Reflections on Cannes 2010, FRESH AIR FROM WHYY (May 25, 2010),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyd=127109780 (stating that 5% of movies
are occupying 95% of screen space). The move to 3-D technology and digitization will only
exacerbate this inequality. Id. (describing 3-D as "the great mantra for Hollywood" and
"Freddie Krueger" for "the rest of the world"); The Worldwide Cinema Boom, supra note
329, at 63.
383 Anderson, supra note 349, at 9-10. Movie-going serves as a form of cultural
voyeurism, enabling armchair exploration of an alternative existence. As tastes in travel
grow more adventurous in a globalized age, so will tastes for exotic filmmaking.
384 See generally Martin, supra note 79, at 15.
385 See Singh, supra note 347, at 49 (describing filmmaking flourishing in China, India,
Korea, Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa as "not despite but because of global
communications networks" operating on commercial lines).
386 Complaining governments must prove a causal nexus between subsidies and claimed
injury. Agreement on Subsidies, art. 11, 12. The decentralized targeting of Korea's
subsidies (tax incentives, infrastructure) would preclude such a showing because they bestow
diffuse and hard-to-quantify benefits from which it would be all-but-impossible to trace
adverse competitive effects. By contrast, patronage involves giving specific money to
specific actors in ways that more overtly distort market competition. See Wright, supra note
46, at 745.
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prohibition on export subsidies.38 7
Should policy-makers concentrate on developing digital markets as the
answer to diversity concerns? Certainly, basic investments in digital
infrastructure seem warranted-and could pay lasting dividends. 88
Cultural protectionists are already contemplating more ambitious efforts to
regulate digital markets, and several governments have taken tentative steps
down this path.389 Yet, Europe's characteristically dirigiste course is likely
to have just as perverse outcomes online as it has off. o9 Moreover, given
the uncertain nature of the target, aggressive action to regulate digital
markets is likely to prove premature and possibly counterproductive.3 91
In the short run, a more promising policy lever can be found off-line.
As noted, barriers to global distribution remain a key hurdle, which
producers of diverse content struggle to overcome. While digital
technologies can bypass the capacity constraints of analog markets, they do
not alter the basic winner-take-all structure of audiovisual markets.392
Perhaps the biggest challenge is getting noticed in a crowded
marketplace. 39 3 For this, old-fashioned theatrical exhibition still delivers
the biggest splash. Successful theatrical releases can set in motion a
3 WTO rules classify export subsidies as "red light" measures that are prohibited per se
to the extent that government benefits are tied to export activities. MICHAEL TREBILCOCK &
ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 32-33 (3d ed. 2005).
388 Korea, characteristically, has taken an early lead in this regard. See Korea's Digital
Wave Travels Far, supra note 231.
389 The new EU Audiovisual Directive purports to regulate diversity in online platforms
directly. See Hettich, supra note 3, at 1449; see also Joanna Smith, Regulate Internet, CRTC
Told, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 17, 2009, available at http://www.thestar.com/News/Canadal
article/588649 (describing similar Canadian efforts). Plans to tax internet businesses to fund
digital diversity initiatives are also underway in several countries. See id.
390 European state patronage has already expanded to such novel domains as video game
production. Ian Mundell, French Game Subsidy Cleared: EU Says Tax Break Passes
Cultural Test, VARIETY, Dec. 13, 2007, available at http://stage.variety.com/article/
VR1117977634.html?categoryid=19&cs=l. France and Germany have also poured millions
into a quixotic attempt to develop internet search capabilities for avowedly cultural motives.
See Quaero's Challenge: I Search, Therefore I Am: But Europe's Web Project is Unlikely to
Reverse US Dominance, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2006, at 14. As noted, Europe has also
undertaken a series of unilateral measures to clip the wings of American e-commerce
competitors. See supra note 53. However, ultimately, none of these measures will substitute
for lack of a commercially thriving content industry.
39m1 Digital markets and technologies present a rapidly-moving target. You don't want to
miss the target, but don't want to cripple it either. See generally Ben Depoorter, Technology
and Uncertainty: The Shaping Effect on Copyright Law, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 1831, 1832-36
(2009) (explaining the challenges in regulating digital markets).
392 WALDFOGEL, supra note 382, at 125-26.
393 This problem applies online as well as off. See HINDMAN, supra note 361, at 14-15;
Daniel Fleder & Kartik Hosangar, Blockbuster Culture's Next Rise or Fall: The Impact of
Recommender Systems on Sales Diversity 23 (Net Inst., Working Paper No. 07-10, 2008),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-955984 (discussing "cold start" problem whereby user-
generated filters only recommend works that other users already know about).
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cascading value chain of downstream revenues and generate stronger word-
of-mouth than any other source.3 94 Yet, capacity constraints on theatrical
distribution remain a crucial bottleneck that entrenches Hollywood's global
advantage.395  Such barriers, therefore, present a promising target for a
trade-supportive cultural protectionism to attack.
Korea's successful use of screen quotas has prompted renewed interest
in such mechanisms to promote domestic exhibition. However, domestic
quotas have serious drawbacks. Setting the quota at the right level can be
challenging given the uncertain nature of creative markets. Set too low, the
quota becomes redundant. Set too high, it may exceed domestic capacity,
tempting producers to chum out low quality filler that tarnishes the
reputation of domestic films. Moreover, privileged access to the domestic
market can turn the focus of content inward, limiting its export potential.396
Realizing the potential of global markets to sustain diverse audiovisual
content may, therefore, require international initiative.
B. International Solutions
1. Creating an Export-Focused "Cultural Exception"?
One option would be to enact a "cultural exception" within world trade
law that would enable measures specifically designed to promote cross-
cultural exchange. Such an export-focused "cultural exception" might be
written to override Article IV's limitation of screen quota eligibility to
domestic films, opening up the quota to diverse films from any source. 397 It
could also sanction export subsidies for cultural products under specified
conditions.3 98 Whatever its intrinsic merits, from the standpoint of practical
politics, a "cultural exception" approach has scant prospect of success. The
394 See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
3 While multiplexes offer more screens per cinema, the big budget blockbusters hog
most of them. See supra note 378; Messerlin & Cocq, supra note 70, at 8. Moreover,
Hollywood's stranglehold on global distribution ensures that diverse competitors never even
get the chance to audition.
396 See Kim, supra note 246, at 373.
397 For reasons why we might want to relax Article IV's restriction, see infra subsection
2. As a matter of trade policy, there is no a priori reason to limit screen quota benefits solely
to national films, a result that leads to less trade rather than more and cuts against the grain
of other trade rules. Cf GATT, art. III (national treatment); GATT, art. XIII (non-
discriminatory quotas); GATT, art. XX (chapeau). The principle differences between the
quota under this expanded Article IV approach and the budget-based diversity quota
proposed below is that the former could operate explicitly based on national origin.
3 The WTO's per se bar on export subsidies is premised on the idea that it is
particularly objectionable (or provocative) to target subsidies to encroach upon neighboring
markets. Yet, culture is not fungible. If we are serious about cultural diversity, more
choices benefit consumers and subsidies may therefore be warranted. See WALDFOGEL,
supra note 382, at 140-45. At the very least, we should not automatically condemn such
efforts without proof of significant market harms.
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politics of the "trade and culture" debate are frozen around the status quo,
and none of the principal players has the heart to push for changes.
Instead, a better approach would be to craft a multilateral solution that is
compatible with existing trade disciplines.
2. Establishing a Global "Diversity Quota"
Perhaps the most effective way to promote diverse audiovisual exports
would be to convert screen quotas into mechanisms for global
distribution.40 0 The crucial change would be that screen quota eligibility
would no longer be restricted to domestic producers. Policy-makers should
take calls for global diversity literally and create a multilateral quota regime
open to creative content originating from any diverse source. Doing so
would greatly augment the effectiveness of screen quotas as a distribution
tool and indirect subsidy while alleviating many of their drawbacks.40'
Converting domestic screen quotas into "diversity quotas" would
instantly create a global market for diverse content. Expanding
opportunities for filmmakers to export their work would facilitate
economies of scale and avoid the introverting effect of existing screen
quotas. In practice, such a proposal would still primarily benefit domestic
producers in their home markets given an inherent audience bias toward
locally produced content.4 02 However, it would prevent domestic producers
from taking preferential market access for granted (avoiding the "quota
quickie" phenomenon) and, conversely, encourage them to compete for a
share of the global "diversity market."
A global diversity quota would greatly expand the pool of "diverse
content" available to meet such quotas, reducing the vagaries of supply
399 See supra notes 43-44, 54-55 and accompanying text.
400 Theatrical distribution under the quota would jumpstart the value chain of follow-on
revenues in derivative markets, including online platforms. See supra notes 112-13 and
accompanying text.
401 Switzerland operates an analogous scheme to promote diverse film exhibition through
subsidies. Ivan Bernier, For Better Access to the Diversity of Foreign Film Offerings,
CHRONIQUE 5, 5-7 (2003), available at http://www.diversite-culturelle.qc.ca/fileadmin/
documents/pdflupdate0307.pdf. Quotas would work better than subsidies in a global system,
however, because quotas are more transparent (encouraging reciprocity), more equitable
(given participating states of unequal means), and more predictable (i.e., not subject to fiscal
uncertainty). Countries could still choose to supplement the quota with targeted subsidies to
ease the burden on local exhibitors/distributors. They could also adopt variable compliance
standards that e.g., set a lower quota for rural single-screen theaters compared to urban
multiplexes, as does Brazil. Randal Johnson, supra note 245, at 135-56.
402 Audiences prefer to watch films and TV shows made in their language that speaks
directly to their own experiences and everyday realities. Baker, supra note 1, at 1365-67.
Accordingly, most films screened under the quota would likely remain of domestic origin.
However, such preferences are only relative, not absolute. French-Canadian movies could
play in Paris; Turkish films could travel to Kazakhstan. It would be left to individual
distributor/exhibitors to weigh competing products in fulfilling the quota.
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caused by restricting eligibility to producers in a single country. This
would allow policy-makers to set the quota level at a higher threshold,
acting as a pace-setter to stimulate local production without the risk of
devaluing quality. It would also reduce the hardship on distributors and
exhibitors, while encouraging them to explore alternative channels of
supply.
At present, GATT Article IV restricts screen quota eligibility to
national films. 403  Defining "diversity" on a nationality-specific basis
beyond the narrow limits of Article IV would likely run afoul of WTO trade
law.404 To make the "diversity quota" consistent with WTO rules, it would
therefore need to operate on a non-discriminatory basis. To do this,
diversity should be defined in terms of production budgets in a manner that
would exclude big budget films by Hollywood majors and their affiliates,
while still allowing American indies to benefit.405
Operating on such a "nationality-blind" basis would keep the diversity
quota regime on the safe side of world trade law.406 The quota could still be
challenged as an indirect form of discrimination since Hollywood would
bear the brunt of the losses. However, quota defenders would have a fairly
strong case. First, it is arguable that in many countries, U.S. blockbusters
and indie/foreign "art films" occupy distinct market segments. If so, the
two may not be considered "like products" for which non-discrimination
403 See GATT, art. IV.
404 The United States has objected to Switzerland's diversity subsidy scheme on this
basis. See Bernier, supra note 401, at 7-9. Switzerland's defense that its subsidies target
diversity in terms of underrepresented nationalities and do not a priori target films from
particular countries would seem to rest on shaky ground. Id. at 8.
405 A diversity cutoff of $30 million, for example, would catch virtually all Hollywood
movies (whose budgets today average upward of $70 million), while excluding all but the
biggest non-American blockbuster films. For example, over the two years from 2007-2008,
France averaged twelve movies with budgets over $30 million out of more than 400 total.
CENTRE NATIONAL DU CINEMA ET DE L'IMAGE ANIMEE, SECTORAL STATISTICS, available at
http://www.cncfr/CNC_GALLERYCONTENT/DOCUMENTS/statistiques/par secteurFR
pdf/ProductionCine.pdf Korea has produced only one as of 2007. Brooks Barnes, New
Tactics Aim to Make Korean Film a Hit in the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/10/business/worldbusiness/l0dragon.html (describing
DRAGON WARS "film's $30 million budget... [as] thought to be the largest ever for a
Korean studio"); KOREAN FILM COUNCIL, KOREAN CINEMA 2008 463 (Yang You-jeong ed.,
2008), available at http://www.koreanfilm.or.kr/KOFIC/Channel?task-kofic.user.eng.d
publication.command.PublicationRetrieve 1 Cmd&GesipanSCD=000000000000000001
(noting that over the four years from 2004-2007, only ten Korean films had budgets in
excess of $10 billion won-roughly $10 million U.S. dollars); MOTION PICTURE Ass'N OF
AMERICA, THEATRICAL MARKET STATISTICS 2007, available at http://www.mpaa.org/2007-
US-Theatrical-Market-Statistics-Report.pdf.
406 A budget-based quota offers a further advantage: it would prevent Hollywood from
outsourcing its production under the cover of other nationalities. It would also limit the
temptation for other film industries to monopolize the global benefits of the quota through
big-budget blockbuster style productions.
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duties apply.4 07 Second, even if the films do constitute "like products," the
quota defenders could argue they have legitimate grounds to discriminate
by budget in order to promote diversity of expression and allow a broader
spectrum of voices to be represented.4 8 Quota defenders could also point
to specific social concerns predominantly associated with blockbuster films
(e.g., excessive violence, escapist narratives, objectification of women).4 09
So long as the quota defenders can show a reasonably objective correlation
between the budget criterion and the stated quota goals and so long as
American indie films still benefit and the larger European or Korean
blockbusters are excluded, a WTO panel would hesitate to second-guess a
Member State's sovereign right to regulate its cultural markets on this
facially neutral basis. 410
Using budget size as a proxy for diversity has other advantages over
existing protectionist regulations. Such an approach avoids the frequent
difficulties in classifying national origin. In theory, film's "nationality" can
be determined based on the nationality of the people making it, the source
of funding, the production location, the language used, or even the
storyline. Protectionist regimes often employ a multifactor test that weighs
all of these criteria (and more). In the case of international co-productions,
the scoring can get even messier. Such complex, subjective inquiries can
easily become a proxy for illiberal notions of cultural authenticity.411
Relying on budget size obviates the need for such classificatory debacles. 4 12
Because production budgets represent a much less ambiguous criterion than
nationality, making this switch would allow the quota to operate in a
407 TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 387, at 100-01. The trend toward digitization and
3-D film production strengthens this argument by accentuating such distinctions, "Cinema is
evolving from a commodity into a business that sells differentiated products at varied prices"
and screens them in separate venues. The Worldwide Cinema Boom, supra note 329, at 63-
64. The quota could be structured to more explicitly exploit this distinction, e.g. by limiting
eligibility to films produced and released in purely 2-D formats. Doing so, however, would
still allow big-budget 2-D films to dominate. Note that lowering the quota threshold in terms
of the budget cutoff would also strengthen the "unlike" distinction.
408 Such an argument would appeal to various human rights norms and UNESCO
agreements to which WTO members are shared signatories to establish diversity of
expression as a prima facie legitimate objective. More controversially, quota defenders
could also argue that the UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity itself constitutes
international recognition of cultural diversity as a legitimate aim. Although the US is not a
signatory, the Convention could potentially still constitute relevant custom law under the
logic of the U.S.-Turtle case, which held that widely accepted international conventions can
instantiate baseline understanding of global values. TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 387,
at 531; Azzi, supra note 2, at 768.
409 To be sure, it would be possible to regulate such issues more directly-but only at a
risk of entering into unacceptable content discrimination.
410 TREBLCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 387, at 94-99, 110.
411 See supra note 154.
412 See Messerlin, supra note 203, at 308-09.
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decentralized fashion that avoids cumbersome bureaucracies. 413 Redefining
diversity in terms of budget would thus provide a more efficient mechanism
for cultural protection and one that better safeguards freedom of expression.
Furthermore, the beauty of the "diversity quota" regime proposed here
is that it could be adopted by likeminded states immediately (with others
joining later on a reciprocal basis) without any need for multilateral
agreements based on WTO consensus. A diversity quota regime along
these lines would be less trade restrictive than alternative measures that
balkanize national markets because it encourages cross-border exchange
and only restricts a particular class of motion pictures. If successful, it
could alleviate demands for a WTO cultural exception, thereby defusing
much of the tension that infuses the trade vs. culture debate.
V. CONCLUSION
European cultural protectionism has not failed for lack of funding or
effort. Its failures reflect basic design flaws: bureaucratic mechanisms that
turn producers into paper-pushers; a state funded monopoly that threatens
free speech; elitist values that scorn popular taste; pointless production of
films no one watches; and an introverted focus on home markets that is
commercially disabling. Such self-inflicted injuries have reduced Europe's
once thriving film industry to a shadow of its former self.
At its core, Europe's failure springs from the false assumption that
culture is incompatible with commerce and that trade is the enemy of
diversity. The persistence of this misguided belief has not only caused
lasting damage to Europe cinema, but it has inflicted serious harm to the
fabric of international trade law, blocked liberalization, and undermined
efforts to advance e-commerce governance.
Korea's example offers a better way forward. Using decentralized
subsidies combining infrastructural investments and tax incentives backed
by the safety net of a reinvigorated screen quota, Korean policy-makers set
in motion a remarkable cultural and commercial renaissance. Korea's
success has established a new paradigm for cultural protection, combining
decentralized subsidies with diversity through trade.
Culture protectionists are right about one thing: Culture is not a
fungible commodity. More choices make everyone better off. We can
watch a Hollywood blockbuster one day, a Japanese spaghetti western the
next, Hong Kong kung fu followed by Nigerian ju ju. However, this is an
argument for more trade, rather than less. Films are expensive to produce
but cheap to distribute. You can show the same film around the world at
little additional cost-so why not share the wealth? In clinging to their
fragmented national markets, Europeans are playing a self-defeating game.
413 Indeed, a global certification process to determine quota eligibility could be
outsourced to an independent, neutral organization (e.g., UNESCO or an NGO).
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Their despair at Hollywood's "unfair" economies of scale mistakes an
opportunity for a threat. By contrast, Korea, India, Nigeria, and Hong Kong
have shown that by tapping into global markets commercial success can
drive cultural vitality.
Cultural protection should be reengineered accordingly. The European
top-down approach should be replaced by decentralized policies that are
both more effective and less trade restrictive. In the long run, the diversity
potential of digital economies may provide a lasting solution. However, in
order to jump-start a global market for diverse filmmaking, adoption of the
"diversity quota" proposed in this Article would serve as a constructive
interim step.
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